Friday, March 05, 2010





FDA Calls on Food Companies to Correct Labeling Violations

This posting was written by William Zale, Editor of CCH Advertising Law Guide.

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration has notified 17 food manufacturers that the labeling for 22 of their food products violates the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

The action follows an October 2009 statement by Commissioner of Food and Drugs Margaret Hamburg, M.D., encouraging companies to review their labeling to ensure that they were in compliance with FDA regulations, and were truthful and not misleading.

Letter to Industry

In an open letter to Industry dated March 3, 2010, Dr. Hamburg underscored the importance of providing nutrition information that consumers could rely on.

“Today, ready access to reliable information about the calorie and nutrient content of food is even more important, given the prevalence of obesity and diet-related diseases in the United States,” Dr. Hamburg said in the letter.

She also expressed her hope that the warning letters would clarify the FDA’s expectations for food manufacturers as they review their current labeling.

Front-of-Package Labeling Initiative

Dr. Hamburg has made nutrition labeling a priority for the FDA. The warning letters are the agency’s most recent action to help improve consumers’ ability to make nutritious choices.

The FDA soon will propose guidance regarding calorie and nutrient labeling on the front of food packages and plans to work collaboratively with the food industry to design and implement innovative approaches to front-of-package.

Warning Letters

The violations cited in the warning letters include unauthorized health claims, unauthorized nutrient content claims, and the unauthorized use of terms such as “healthy,” and others that have strict, regulatory definitions.

Companies that received warning letters have 15 business days to inform the FDA of the steps they will take to correct their labeling, according to the FDA’s press release.

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Firm: Dreyers Grand Ice Cream, Inc.

Product: Nestle Drumstick Classic Vanilla Fudge

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The front panel shows that the product has no trans fat, but it doesn't have a disclosure statement to alert consumers that the product has significant levels of saturated fat and total fat.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Dreyers Grand Ice Cream, Inc.

Product: Dreyers Dibs Bite Sized Ice Cream Snacks Vanilla Ice Cream with Nestle Crunch Coating

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The front panel shows that the product has no trans fat, but it doesn't have a disclosure statement to alert consumers that the product has significant levels of saturated fat and total fat.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Gorton's, Inc.

Product: Gorton's Fish Fillets

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The front panel shows that the product has no trans fat, but it doesn't have a disclosure statement to alert consumers that the product has significant levels of sodium, saturated fat and total fat.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Schwan's Consumer Brands

Product:Mrs. Smith's Coconut Custard Pie

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The front panel shows that the product has no trans fat, but it doesn't have a disclosure statement to alert consumers that the product has significant levels of saturated fat and total fat.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Spectrum Organic Products, Inc.

Product: Organic All Vegetable Shortening

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The front panel shows that the product has no trans fat, but it doesn't have a disclosure statement to alert consumers that the product has significant levels of saturated fat and total fat.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Spectrum Organic Products, Inc.

Product: Organic All Vegetable Shortening

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes nutrient content claims such as "cholesterol free," "less saturated fat than butter," and "good source of … monounsaturated fat," but does not meet the legal requirements to make these claims.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Beech-nut

Product: Beechnut DHA Plus line of products

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims on its website such as "no added refined sugar" and "plus vitamins and minerals," which are not allowed on products intended for children under 2 yrs of age because appropriate dietary levels have not been established for children in this age range.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm:Beech-nut

Product: Beechnut Whole Grain Oatmeal with mixed fruit

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims such as "low sodium," "plus fiber," and "plus vitamins & minerals," which are not allowed on products intended for children under 2 yrs of age because appropriate dietary levels have not been established for children in this age range.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm:PBM Products

Product:Parent's Choice Little Puffs Plus Calcium Blueberry Naturally Flavored

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims such as "plus calcium," which are not allowed on products intended for children under 2 yrs of age because appropriate dietary levels have not been established for children in this age range.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm:PBM Products

Product: Parent's Choice Little Puffs Made with Whole Grains Peach-Mango Naturally Flavored

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims such as "a good source of calcium," "a good source of Vitamin D," and "a good source of iron," which are not allowed on products intended for children under 2 yrs of age because appropriate dietary levels have not been established for children in this age range.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Nestle

Product: Juicy Juice Brain Development Fruit Juice Beverage

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims such as "no sugar added," which are not allowed on products intended for children under 2 yrs of age because appropriate dietary levels have not been established for children in this age range.

Action: Warning Letter (issued 12/2009)

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Firm: Nestle

Product: Juicy Juice All-Natural 100% Juice Orange Tangerine and Juicy Juice All-Natural 100% Juice Grape

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product labels imply that the products are 100% juice when they are actually
juice blends with added flavors.

Action: Warning Letter (issued 12/2009)

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Firm: Nestle Nutrition

Product: Gerber's 2nd Foods Carrots

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims such as "healthy," "excellent source of … Vitamin A," and "no added sugar," which are not allowed on products intended for children under 2 yrs of age because appropriate dietary levels have not been established for children in this age range.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Nestle Nutrition

Product: Gerber Graduates Puffs

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims such as "good source of iron, zinc, and Vitamin E," which are not allowed on products intended for children under 2 yrs of age because appropriate dietary levels have not been established for children in this age range.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Redco Foods

Product: Salada Naturally Decaffeinated Green Tea

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims that it will treat, prevent, or cure diseases such as Alzheimer's disease, rheumatism, and cancer. These types of claims are not allowed on food products.

Action: Warning letter

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Firm: Redco Foods

Product: Salada Naturally Decaffeinated Green Tea

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims on the product website that it is effective in the prevention of cardiovascular disease, but this claim has been not authorized for this product.

Action: Warning letter

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Firm: Redco Foods

Product: Salada Naturally Decaffeinated Green Tea

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims such as "fortified with antioxidants," but the claim does not meet the requirements of the antioxidant regulation.

Action: Warning letter

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Firm: Sunsweet Growers

Product: Antioxidant Blend Dried Fruit Mix

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims such as “full of nutritious antioxidants,” but the claim does not meet the requirements of the antioxidant regulation.

Action: Warning letter

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Firm: Fleminger Inc.

Product: TeaForHealth Green Tea products Dr. Lee's TeaForHealth 710EGCG inabottle Green TeaTea For Health 710EGCG Ready-To-Drink Natural Brewed Green Tea

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims that it will treat, prevent, or cure diseases such as Alzheimer's disease, diabetes, and cancer. These types of claims are not allowed on food products.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Fleminger Inc.

Product: TeaForHealth Green Tea products Dr. Lee's TeaForHealth 710EGCG inabottle Green TeaTea For Health 710EGCG Ready-To-Drink Natural Brewed Green Tea

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: FDA has authorized a qualified health claim for green tea, but the claims for these products do not meet the criteria established by FDA.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Fleminger Inc.

Product: TeaForHealth Green Tea products Dr. Lee's TeaForHealth 710EGCG inabottle Green TeaTea For Health 710EGCG Ready-To-Drink Natural Brewed Green Tea

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims such as "drink high antioxidant green tea," but the claim does not meet the requirements of the antioxidant regulation.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: POM Wonderful

Product: POM Wonderful 100% Pomegranate Juice

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims that it will treat, prevent, or cure diseases such as hypertension, diabetes, and cancer. These types of claims are not allowed on food products.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Ken's Foods, Inc.

Product: Ken's Healthy Options Salad Dressings

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims such as, "Healthy Options," but has more fat than is allowed in products labeled as "healthy."

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Pompeian, Inc.

Product: Pompeian Imported Extra Light Olive Oil

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes nutrient content claims such as "light," and "high in good monounsaturated fat," but doesn't meet the requirement to make these claims.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Pompeian, Inc.

Product: Pompeian Imported Extra Light Olive Oil

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims that it will treat, prevent, or cure diseases such as heart disease and cancer. These types of claims are not allowed on food products.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Diamond Food,Inc.

Product: Diamond of California Shelled Walnuts

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product label makes claims that the product can help prevent heart disease. FDA has authorized a claim relating walnuts and heart disease, but the claim on this product doesn't meet the requirements to make the claim.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Diamond Food,Inc.

Product: Diamond of California Shelled Walnuts

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product makes claims that it will treat, prevent, or cure diseases such as heart disease, arthritis and cancer. These types of claims are not allowed on food products.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: First Juice, Inc.

Product: Organic Fruit and Veggie Juice Beverage products

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product make claims such as "plus calcium," and "50% less sugar," which are not allowed on products intended for children under 2 yrs of age because appropriate dietary levels have not been established for children in this age range.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: First Juice, Inc.

Product: Purple carrot products

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The products make claims that the products will "reduce the risk of cancer and stroke," This claim has not been authorized by FDA for use on food products.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Want Want Foods

Product: Baby Mum-Mum Original Selected Superior Rice Rusks

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product make claims such as "low in fat," and "no added fats for oils," which are not allowed on products intended for children under 2 yrs of age because appropriate dietary levels have not been established for children in this age range.

Action: Warning Letter

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Firm: Nature's Path Foods, Inc.

Product: Organic Flax Plus Multibran Cereal

Type of Claim of Major Topic Area: The product label includes the nutrient claim, "excellent source of Omega-3+," which has not been approved for use on food products.

Action: Untitled Letter

Thursday, March 04, 2010





Senate Confirms Brill and Ramirez as FTC Commissioners

This posting was written by John W. Arden.

Julie Simone Brill and Edith Ramirez were confirmed by the Senate yesterday as Federal Trade Commissioners. Brill will serve a seven-year term, starting from September 26, 2009, while Ramirez will serve a seven-year term, starting from September 26, 2008.

“We look forward to welcoming the newly confirmed Federal Trade Commissioners Julie Brill and Edith Ramirez,” said FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz. “They are both exceptionally talented and committed, and will bring a wealth of experience, knowledge, and new energy to the Commission.”

The Chairman remarked how the announcement was “bittersweet” because of the imminent departure of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour.

“She has been a wonderful colleague and dedicated public servant over the years, and will be greatly missed,” Leibowitz said.

The two new Commissioners were nominated by the Obama Administration on November 17, 2009. Brill was nominated to succeed Commissioner Jones Harbour, whose term expired last September. Ramirez was nominated to serve the vacancy created by the departure of Commissioner Deborah Platt Majoras in March 2008.

Brill has served as Senior Deputy Attorney General and Chief of Consumer Protection for North Carolina since February 2009. Prior to that, she was an Assistant Attorney for Consumer Protection and Antitrust for the State of Vermont for more than 20 years. She is an adjunct faculty member at Columbia Law School.

Ramirez was a partner in the Los Angeles office of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver & Hedges, specializing in intellectual property and complex litigation. She is a graduate of Harvard Law School, where she worked on the Harvard Law Review with President Obama.

For the first time in nearly two years, the Federal Trade Commission has a full complement of members. The addition of two new Commissioners brings the membership to three Democrats (Commissiioners Leibowitz, Brill, and Ramirez) and two Republicans (Commissioners William Kovacic and J. Thomas Rosch).




Repeal of Health Insurance Antitrust Exemption Passes House

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

Health insurers would lose their exemption from the federal antitrust laws under the proposed "Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act," which was overwhelmingly approved by the House of Representatives on February 24. The measure (H.R. 4626) passed 406 to 19.

Specifically, the bill would amend the McCarran-Ferguson Act to add a provision stating that the Act does not "modify, impair, or supersede the operation of any of the antitrust laws with respect to the business of health insurance."

Freestanding Measure

The measure was introduced by Representatives Tom Perriello (D-Virginia) and Betsy Markey (D-Colorado) on February 22. The freestanding measure followed a similar bill, which had been incorporated into the comprehensive health care bill passed by the House last year.

The now-stalled "Affordable Health Care for America Act" (H.R. 3962) contained a provision repealing the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption for health insurance as well as medical malpractice insurance from certain antitrust violations, including price fixing, market allocation, or monopolization.

Upholding “Free Market Protections”

House Judiciary Committee Chairman John Conyers, Jr. (D-Michigan) said that the bill "will uphold free-market protections by making insurance companies legally accountable for collusion schemes to fix prices, divide up markets and customers to restrict choice, and use monopoly power to sabotage anyone who seeks to offer meaningful competitive choice to consumers."

House Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Lamar Smith (R-Texas) said the Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act "has all the substance of a soup made by boiling the shadow of a chicken." Smith contended that the McCarran-Ferguson Act's federal antitrust exemption promotes competition by allowing small and medium-sized insurers to aggregate information for underwriting purposes so they can compete effectively against larger companies.

Impact on Premiums

According to Smith, the Congressional Budget Office had concluded that the impact on health insurance premiums resulting from the repeal of the antitrust exemption would likely to be quite small. In any event, Smith ultimately offered his reluctant support for what he called the "ineffective bill."

Following passage by the House, the bill was received by the Senate on February 25 and then read for the first time and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar on February 26. It was read the second time and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders on March 1.

Further information about the bill, including full text, is available here at the Library of Congress Thomas legislative website.

Wednesday, March 03, 2010





Sham Drug Patent Litigation, Not Reverse Payments, Could Have Violated Antitrust Law

This posting was written by Darius Sturmer, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

The manufacturer of a branded drug used to treat male hypogonadisma and three generic drug manufacturers could have conspired to restrain trade in violation of federal antitrust law by entering into settlements of sham patent infringement litigation under which the generic drug makers kept their versions off the market in exchange for a portion of the branded manufacturer's monopoly profits, the federal district court in Atlanta has ruled.

However, several other antitrust claims brought by the FTC and putative classes of direct and indirect purchasers were not similarly viable.
Specifically, the court rejected claims that the reverse payment aspect of the settlements rendered them illegal and the drug makes had violated antitrust law by agreeing not to compete.

Also rejected were (1) claims by all of the plaintiffs that the drug companies had attempted to monopolize the market for the generic version through an overall scheme that included improper patent listing in the Food and Drug Administration's Orange Book, the filing of sham litigation, and the reverse payment settlements and (2) claims by indirect purchasers that the defendants' actions violated the common law and antitrust laws of 40 states.

Therefore, the defendants' motions to dismiss were granted as to the claims of the FTC and indirect purchasers and granted in part and denied in part as to the claims of the direct purchasers.

Noerr-Pennington Immunity

Three of the defendants asserted immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which provides that no antitrust liability may arise from petitioning the government for an anticompetitive outcome. Immune petitioning activity may include legislative lobbying and administrative and judicial proceedings. However, there is a well-established exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine for sham litigation.

In this case, the complaining putative class of direct purchasers sufficiently alleged that the branded manufacturer's infringement actions were objectively baseless on the grounds that the generic versions clearly did not infringe the original patent covering the drug and the patent clearly did not meet the written description requirement as to the drug's composition ranges, the court reasoned.

The drug manufacturers did not unreasonably restrain trade simply by entering into settlements under which the generic drug makers were paid to keep their generic versions off the market, the court found. Because the complaining drug purchasers and FTC did not allege that the settlements exceeded the scope of the manufacturer's patent on the drug, it did not matter that the companies settled their patent disputes with reverse payments.

By their nature, patents created an environment of exclusion and crippled competition. Thus, the anticompetitive effect was already present. It was irrelevant whether the patent might ultimately be found invalid. Moreover, the conduct was not illegal per se. Per se illegality analysis did not apply to reverse payments, the court noted.

The February 22 decision is In re: Androgel Antitrust Litigation (No. II), 2010-1 Trade Cases ¶76,914.

Tuesday, March 02, 2010





Current Gasoline Franchisees May Not Claim Constructive Termination, Nonrenewal: High Court

This posting was written by John W. Arden.

Gasoline station franchisees may not maintain actions for constructive termination or constructive nonrenewal under the federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA) after accepting renewal agreements from a franchisor and continuing to operate their franchises, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a unanimous decision on March 2.

The high court held that (1) franchisees cannot recover for constructive termination under the PMPA if the franchisor’s allegedly wrongful conduct did not compel the franchisees to abandon their franchises and (2) franchisees that sign a renewal agreement and continue to operate their franchises may not maintain a claim for constructive nonrenwal under the PMPA.

Petroleum Marketing Practices Act

The PMPA (15 U.S.C. §2801—§2807, CCH Business Franchise Guide ¶6940) establishes federal minimum standards for the termination and nonrenewal of gasoline franchises, authorizing franchisors to end a franchise relationship only for enumerated causes and with advance written notice. To enforce these requirements, franchisees may bring suit in federal court for equitable relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.

For many years the franchisor (Shell Oil Company) provided its Massachusetts franchisees with a rent subsidy that reduced the monthly rent of franchise premises for every gallon of gasoline sold. The subsidy was renewed annually by written notice, and franchisor representatives made oral representations that the subsidy or something like it “would always exist.”

Discontinuation of Rent Subsidy

In 1998, the franchisor assigned its rights and obligations to a joint venture (Motiva), which ended the volume-based rent subsidy and offered franchisees renewal agreements that contained a new formula for calculating rent. These actions generally resulted in an increase of rent.

Sixty-three franchisees filed suit against Shell and the joint venture in July 2001, alleging that the discontinuation of the rent subsidy constituted a breach of contract under state law and a “constructive termination” within the PMPA. They further claimed that the joint venture’s offer of new franchise agreements calculating rent in a different way amounted to a “constructive nonrenewal.”

After trial of these claims in the federal district court in Boston, a jury found against the franchisor and the joint venture on all claims. Both defendants had unsuccessfully moved for judgment as a matter of law on the PMPA claims, arguing that they could not be held liable for constructive termination or nonrenewal because none of the franchisees abandoned their franchises.

On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that a franchisee is not required to abandon its franchise to recover for constructive termination. A simple breach of contract can amount to constructive termination, the court held, if the breach resulted in “such a material change that it effectively ended the lease . . . ” On the other hand, the First Circuit agreed with the defendants that a franchisee continuing to operate under a renewal agreement cannot maintain a claim for lawful nonrenewal under the PMPA. (Marcoux v. Shell Oil Products Co, LLC, CCH Business Franchise Guide ¶13,890).

Supreme Court Petitions

Subsequently, both the franchisees and the franchisor filed petitions for review by the U.S. Supreme Court. (Mac's Shell Service, Inc. v. Shell Oil Products Co., Docket No. 08-240, and Shell Oil Products Co. v. Mac's Shell Service, Inc., Docket No. 08-372) The Supreme Court granted their petitions on June 15, 2009.

Petitioning franchisees contended that there was a split among the circuits on “whether a franchisor can lawfully present its franchisees with the Hobson’s choice of accepting unlawful contract terms or risking their livelihoods on a chance that a court will grant a preliminary injunction.”

They cited a 1986 Ninth Circuit decision—Pro Sales, Inc. v. Texaco, U.S.A., CCH Business Franchise Guide ¶8604—that recognized the “Catch-22” situation and rejected such a requirement.

Supreme Court Rulings

On review, the Supreme Court concluded that “a necessary element of any constructive termination claim under the Act is that the franchisor’s conduct forced an end to the franchisee’s use of the franchisor’s trademark, purchase of the franchisor’s fuel, or occupation of the franchisor’s service station.”

The PMPA uses the word “terminate,” which ordinarily means “put an end to,” the court said. Thus, when given its ordinary meaning, the Act is violated only if a franchise is put to an end.

“Requiring franchisees to abandon their franchises before claiming constructive termination is also consistent with the general understanding of the doctrine of constructive termination,” Justice Alito wrote. In order for an employee to recover for constructive discharge, he or she generally must quit the job. A tenant claiming constructive eviction must actually move out.

Contentions that this interpretation of the PMPA fails to give franchisees protection from unfair and coercive acts by their franchisors “ignores the fact that franchisees still have state-law remedies available to them,” the Court explained.

On the constructive nonrenewal claim, the Court held that a franchisee choosing to accept a renewal agreement cannot be allowed to thereafter claim wrongful nonrenewal. The plain text of the PMPA says that there is a violation of the statute when the franchisor “fails to renew” a franchise for reasons not provided by the statute. Thus, the threshold requirement of a wrongful nonrenewal action is that there is a nonrenewal.

Continuation or Extension of Relationship

The Act speaks of a franchisor’s failure to reinstate, continue, or extend the franchise relationship, the Court stated. In a situation like this one, the franchises had been continued and extended.

Finally, the Court noted that the PMPA authorizes franchisors to respond to market demands by proposing different contractual terms at the expiration of a franchise agreement. The statute allows franchisors to refuse to renew franchise relationships when the franchisees refuse to agree to changes proposed “in good faith and in the normal course of business.”

Allowing franchisees to sign renewal agreements and then pursue wrongful nonrenewal claims would undermine this procedure and frustrate the franchisors’ ability to propose new terms.

The 20-page opinion in Mac’s Shell Service, Inc. v. Shell Oil Products Co. LLC is available here on the U.S. Supreme Court website. It will appear in CCH Business Franchise Guide.

Monday, March 01, 2010





Tobacco Companies, Justice Department Ask High Court to Review Civil RICO Decision

This posting was written by Mark Engstrom, Editor of CCH RICO Business Disputes Guide.

In five separate petitions, six tobacco companies have asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review a 2009 RICO decision (United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., CCH RICO Business Disputes Guide ¶11,688), which affirmed a finding that the companies were liable for conducting the affairs of a RICO enterprise, through a pattern of mail and wire fraud, in a scheme to deceive consumers about the adverse health effects of cigarette smoking.

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) also filed a petition for review of that decision. The DOJ asked the Court to review the denial of its request for disgorgement.

Tobacco Company Petitions

The tobacco companies—Philip Morris, Altria Group, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, British American Tobacco, and Lorillard—asked the Court to review various constitutional, jurisdictional, and liability issues, as well as issues concerning injunctive relief.

Philip Morris asked the court to decide: (1) whether the First Amendment required an appellate court to conduct an independent review when a district court finds that speech is fraudulent and thus not protected by the Constitution; (2) whether the federal court may exercise injunctive jurisdiction under RICO and Article III of the Constitution when there is no statutory enterprise and when any reasonable likelihood of future violations has been extinguished; and (3) whether injunctions tracking broad statutory commands may be upheld.(Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. United States, Docket No. 09-976, filed February 19, 2010)

Altria Group petitioned the court to decide whether a corporation in a RICO case could demonstrate a specific intent to defraud through “collective knowledge.” (Altria Group v. United States, Docket No. 09-979, filed February 19, 2010).

R.J. Reynolds asked the Court to decide whether the D.C. Circuit had: (1) erroneously imposed liability for “light” and “low-tar” cigarette descriptors; (2) erred by imposing a remedy that required corrective statements; (3) improperly failed to review facts relating to the Constitutional protection of the defendants’ speech, and (4) erred by deeming speech that discussed “matters of public concern” fraudulent. (R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and Brown & Williamson Holding Company v. United States, Docket No. 09-977, filed February 19, 2010)

Lorillard sought a determination of whether: (1) a group of corporations could constitute an association-in-fact enterprise; (2) the appellate court should have conducted an independent review of the district court’s factual findings implicating the First Amendment right to free speech; (3) a wide range of non-commercial speech could be deemed fraudulent when the speech involved important public controversies and scientific opinions, no person associated with Lorillard possessed a specific intent to defraud, and evidence failed to show that the speech was material to a reasonable consumer; (4) the use of “light” and “low tar” was protected by the First Amendment when the Federal Trade Commission had approved the method used to measure tar and nicotine levels; and (5) the appellate court properly affirmed an injunction that tracked broad statutory commands, compelled corrective statements, and failed to find a reasonable likelihood of future RICO violations. (Lorillard Tobacco Company v. United States, Docket No. 09-1012, February 19, 2010)

British American Tobacco asked the Court to decide whether the Circuit court had improperly: (1) ignored the traditional presumption against extraterritoriality and the “affirmative evidence” that Congress had never intended RICO to apply extraterritorially; (2) borrowed from federal securities and antitrust cases the “ill-suited” domestic effects test as a measure of RICO’s extraterritorial reach; (3) approved a version of the effects test that conflicted with the test used by other circuits; and (4) relied on the effects of the domestic conduct of BAT’s co-defendants and of the overall RICO scheme. (British American Tobacco (Investments) Limited v. United States of America, Docket No. 09-980, filed February 19, 2010)

Justice Department Petition

In its petition, the Justice Department requested that the Court determine whether RICO categorically barred the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and other equitable relief that was designed to redress the “continuing consequences of RICO violations.” (United States v. Philip Morris, Docket No. 09-978, filed February 19, 2010)

Friday, February 26, 2010





Distributor, Manufacturer May Share “Community of Interest” under Wisconsin Dealer Law

This posting was written by Pete Reap, Editor of CCH Business Franchise Guide.

A "community of interest" under the meaning of the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law (WFDL) could have existed between a Wisconsin toy distributor and a French manufacturer, bringing the distributorship within the anti-termination provisions of the dealer law, the federal district court in Milwaukee has decided.

The distributor raised several genuine issues of material fact as to whether a "community of interest" existed on the manufacturer's motion for summary judgment on the distributor’s WFDL claims. Thus, the motion was denied, and the dispute was ordered to proceed to trial.

In 2001, the distributor became the manufacturer’s exclusive toy distributor for the United States. The manufacturer unilaterally terminated the distribution relationship in 2006, and the distributor brought suit, alleging that the manufacturer failed to comply with provisions of the WFDL requiring notice and "good cause" for termination and repurchase the distributor’s entire inventory of the manufacturer’s toys.

The manufacturer argued that the distributor was not a “dealer” entitled to the protections of the WFDL because, among other reasons, there was no "community of interest" between the parties.

Substantial Obligations

There was a genuine issue of material fact about whether the relationship was the type of intertwined, dependent relationship that the WFDL was designed to protect, the court ruled. The agreement imposed substantial obligations on the distributor to buy, sell, and promote the manufacturer’s products. The agreement specified minimum purchase quotas and minimum sales, the court noted. The distributor was required to maintain appropriate inventory levels and was not allowed to distribute toys that competed against the manufacturer’s toys.

Percentage of Time and Revenue

The court concluded that the distributor raised a genuine issue of fact about whether the percentage of time it devoted to the manufacturer’s products and whether the revenue it received from the manufacturer’s products constituted a community of interest. The distributor’s sales of the manufacturer’s products accounted for over 20% of its business, a percentage that weighed slightly in favor of finding a community of interest.

Exclusive Right to Sell

The fact that the distributor had the exclusive right to sell the manufacturer’s Erector brand of toys in the United States weighed heavily in favor of finding a community of interest. The distributor used the manufacturer’s brand name as part of its efforts to sell the products but it did not use the name on its exterior signage or on its vehicles. Such use appeared to be minimal and that aspect of the relationship did not satisfy the WFDL, the court held.

The distributor’s rented warehouse was not devoted exclusively to the manufacturer’s products and was adaptable to other uses upon termination of the parties’ agreement. The distributor raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding its investment in inventory but not in physical facilities or goodwill.

Personnel Devoted to Manufacturer’s Line

The distributor raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the personnel devoted to the manufacturer helped to establish a community of interest. The distributor had one employee who worked solely on the manufacturer’s products and contended that every one of its employees worked in furtherance of sales of the manufacturer’s products.

The distributor alleged that it spent $150,000 annually to present the products at a toy fair, $80,000 annually to lease a showroom at a toy fair, and $85,000 to $90,000 annually in marketing expenses, raising an issue of fact about whether its expenditures on advertising and promotion supported a community of interest.

Considering all of the circumstances in a light most favorable to the distributor, the court held that the relationship and the resultant revenues were significant to the distributor’s business. The distributor contended that the termination caused the entire business to collapse. However, the reason for the distributor’s ultimate demise was contested. Thus, the case was allowed to proceed to trial.

The February 10 decision in Brio Corp. v. Meccano S. N. appears at CCH Business Franchise Guide ¶14,305.

Thursday, February 25, 2010





Investment Firm Not Liable Under RICO for Customer's Money Laundering Scheme

This posting was written by Mark Engstrom, Editor of CCH RICO Business Disputes Guide.

The receivers of seven insurance companies that lost nearly $200 million to Martin Frankel, an investor who had purchased the companies in order to loot their assets, could not prevail in a RICO conspiracy claim against Dreyfus Service Corp., the investment company that Frankel used to launder the insurance companies’ funds before moving them to his personal Swiss bank account, the U.S. Court of Appeals in New Orleans has ruled. Their claim failed because Dreyfus was not aware of Frankel’s money laundering activities.

According to the receivers, Dreyfus was liable for treble damages under RICO because the investment company had “effectively joined the conspiracy” by deliberately turning a blind eye to Frankel’s “obviously suspicious” activities.

Had Dreyfus discharged its duties properly, the receivers argued, the investment company would have uncovered Frankel’s money laundering scheme and the insurance companies’ losses would have been averted.

Deliberate Ignorance

The receivers tacitly acknowledged that no one at Dreyfus actually knew about Frankel’s ongoing activities. Nevertheless, they argued that constructive knowledge—and thus a violation of the federal money laundering statute, a RICO predicate act—could be established under the doctrine of deliberate ignorance. Deliberate ignorance existed when a conscious effort was made to avoid positive knowledge of unlawful conduct so one's personal knowledge could be denied if the lawbreaker was caught, the court observed. The doctrine required a conscious action that, in light of the known facts, amounted to a “charade of ignorance.”

Although the structure and speed of Frankel’s transactions were “suggestive of money laundering” and Dreyfus’s efforts to identify the origin, legitimacy, and ultimate destination of the funds passing through its accounts were “non-existent,” evidence failed to show that anyone at Dreyfus either knew or “purposely contrived” to avoid knowing that Frankel was engaging in money laundering, the court decided.

Purposeful Contrivance

The receivers argued that purposeful contrivance was present because Dreyfus’s management: (1) knew that the structure of their corporate policies on the creation, verification, and maintenance of investment accounts created a high probability that the accounts would be used for money laundering; (2) knew what steps it could take to detect money laundering activity; and (3) declined to take those steps. At worst, however, Dreyfus’s activities rose to the level of recklessness, in the court's view. Frankel’s transactions went unnoticed because Dreyfus had not trained its service personnel to recognize the signs of money laundering.

The opinion is Chaney v. Dreyfus Service Corp., CCH RICO Business Disputes Guide ¶11,803.

Wednesday, February 24, 2010





FTC Finds Sensitive Data Leaked from Organizations to P2P Networks

This posting was written by Cheryl Beise, Editor of CCH Guide to Computer Law.

The Federal Trade Commission announced on February 22 that it has notified nearly 100 organizations that personal information emanating from the organizations' computer networks had been shared and was available on peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing networks where it could be accessed and used to commit identity theft or fraud. The information included sensitive data about customers and/or employees.

Notices Sent to Private, Public Entities

The notices went to both private and public entities, including schools and local governments, the agency said. Entities contacted ranged in size from businesses with as few as eight employees to publicly-held corporations employing tens of thousands. The agency also said it opened non-public investigations of other companies whose customer or employee information has been exposed on P2P networks.

The notification letters urged the entities to review their security practices—and. if appropriate, the practices of contractors and vendors—to ensure that they are reasonable, appropriate, and in compliance with the law. The agency posted samples of the letters (Letter A, Letter B, and Letter C), which advise recipients, “It is your responsibility to protect such information from unauthorized access, including taking steps to control the use of P2P software on your own networks and those of your service providers.”

The FTC warned that failure to prevent such information from being shared to a P2P network may constitute a violation of law, including the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act.

“Unfortunately, companies and institutions of all sizes are vulnerable to serious P2P-related breaches, placing consumers’ sensitive information at risk,” said FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz.

“Companies should take a hard look at their systems to ensure that there are no unauthorized P2P file-sharing programs and that authorized programs are properly configured and secure,” Leibowitz counseled.

Notification of Customers, Employees

The FTC also recommended that the entities identify affected customers and employees and consider whether to notify them that their information is available on P2P networks. Many states and federal regulatory agencies have laws or guidelines about businesses notification responsibilities in these circumstances, the agency noted.

Text of the announcement appears here on the FTC website.

To help businesses manage the security risks presented by file-sharing software, the FTC released a new business education brochure, “Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: A Guide for Business,” describing the risks and recommend ways to manage them.

Further information about the FTC’s privacy and data security enforcement actions can be found here.

Tuesday, February 23, 2010





U.S., EC Clear Agreement Between Microsoft and Yahoo!

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

Microsoft Corporation and Yahoo! Inc. announced on February 18 that they would begin implementing their proposed search agreement, after receiving clearance from the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the European Commission (EC).

In an announcement the same day, the Antitrust Division said it had closed its investigation into proposed Internet search and paid search advertising agreement between the companies without taking action. The EC also issued a statement that it had concluded that the deal would not significantly impede effective competition in Europe.

Yahoo!’s algorithmic and paid search platforms will be transitioned to Microsoft, under the parties' proposal. Yahoo! will become the exclusive relationship sales force for both companies’ premium search advertisers globally.

According to the parties' statement, “the companies’ unified search marketplace will deliver improved innovation for consumers, better volume and efficiency for advertisers and better monetization opportunities for web publishers.”

Competition with Google

Both the Antitrust Division and the EC suggested that the transaction would allow Microsoft/Yahoo! to compete more effectively with Google.

“The proposed transaction will combine the back-end search and paid search advertising technology of both parties,” the Antitrust Division explained in its statement. “U.S. market participants express support for the transaction and believe that combining the parties' technology would be likely to increase competition by creating a more viable competitive alternative to Google, the firm that now dominates these markets.”

The transaction “is not likely to harm the users of Internet search, paid search advertisers, Internet publishers, or distributors of search and paid search advertising technology,” in the government's view.

According to the parties, the transaction was also cleared by regulators in Australia, Brazil, and Canada.

Monday, February 22, 2010





New Health Care Proposal Would End Pay-for-Delay Drug Settlements

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

President Barack Obama announced on February 22 his latest proposal for health care reform. One of the provisions of the proposal is aimed at preventing delays in generic drug competition by targeting “pay-for-delay” settlements between drug companies.

Presumption of Illegality

Under the proposal, agreements in which a generic drug manufacturer receives anything of value from a brand-name drug manufacturer would be presumed unlawful if the generic drug manufacturer agrees to limit or forego research, development, marketing, manufacturing, or sales of the generic drug.

The presumption of illegality could be overcome only if the parties to the agreement could demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the procompetitive benefits of the agreement outweighed the anticompetitive effects of the agreement.

The FTC would have enforcement authority to address the problem. The proposal also would require the Chief Executive Officer of the branded pharmaceutical company to certify to the accuracy and completeness of any agreements required to be filed with the FTC.

A summary of the new proposal appears here on the White House website.

FTC Chairman’s Reaction

FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz issued a statement in response to the announcement, expressing his appreciation for the inclusion of restrictions on pay-for-delay settlements.

“When drug companies agree not to compete, consumers lose,” said FTC Chairman Leibowitz. “Ending pay-for-delay settlements will help control drug costs. We’re delighted about the President’s resolute support for this bipartisan initiative.”

Friday, February 19, 2010





Consumer Can Pursue Claim That “Greenlist” Label Was Misleading

This posting was written by William Zale, Editor of CCH Advertising Law Guide.

A class action complaint alleging that a “Greenlist” label used by household cleaning products manufacturer S.C. Johnson was deceptively designed to look like a third party seal of approval could not be dismissed on the grounds that injury was not sufficiently alleged and that no reasonable consumer could have found the label misleading, the federal district court in San Jose has ruled.

Under the California Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising Law, suit may only be brought by a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of a violation.

The consumer sufficiently alleged that he did not receive the benefit of the bargain in that SCJ's Windex cost more than similar products without misleading labeling, according to the court.

On the question of whether the label was misleading, SCJ pointed out that the Greenlist label made no mention of a third party, described Greenlist as a “rating system” not a seal of approval, and directed consumers to SCJ's own website for further information. However, given the alleged context, it was plausible that a reasonable consumer would interpret the Greenlist label as being from a third party, the court found.

While the attributes identified by SCJ were relevant to the inquiry and might weaken the case for deceptiveness, they did not allow a ruling on the issue as a matter of law.

Guidelines issued by the Federal Trade Commission provided that a product label containing an “environmental seal,” such as a globe icon with the text “Earth Smart” around it, “is likely to convey to consumers that the product is environmentally superior to other products” and would be deceptive “[i]f the manufacturer cannot substantiate this broad claim,” the court noted.

The opinion in Koh v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. C-09-00927 RMW, ND Cal., appears at CCH Advertising Law Guide ¶63,741

Thursday, February 18, 2010





Supplement Purchasers Allowed to Proceed with Unfair Competition Class Action

This posting was written by Jody Coultas, Editor of CCH State Unfair Trade Practices Law.

An order denying certification in a consumer’s California Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) class action against the nutritional supplement retailer GNC was reversed because the trial court’s opinion was based on improper legal criteria and incorrect legal assumptions, according to a California appellate court.

Sale of a Controlled Substance

The consumer purchased an over-the-counter nutritional supplement containing androstenediol, a Schedule III controlled substance, from GNC. It is illegal to sell or possess a Schedule III controlled substance without a prescription, but the retailer failed to disclose that its product contained androstenediol.

The consumer (1) alleged that the retailer violated the UCL by selling the supplement in violation of the California Health and Safety Code and other state statutes and (2) sought restitution and injunctive relief. In June 2004, the action was coordinated with five other class actions in Los Angeles Superior Court.

According to the court, the UCL class action claim presented two predominant issues—whether the retailer’s sales were unlawful and whether the profits from those sales must be restored to the class.

Individualized Proof

In a UCL class action, once the named plaintiff shows that he suffered an injury-in-fact and lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition, no further individualized proof of injury or causation is required to impose liability against the defendant in favor of absent class members.

The trial court had erroneously assumed that individualized issues predominated because the court would need to determine whether the legality of the sale was material to each class member.

Misrepresentations

The consumer also alleged that GNC violated the CLRA by misrepresenting the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of supplement and by misrepresenting that the supplements were of a particular standard, quality, or grade.

The consumer sufficiently alleged that a reasonable consumer would find the legality of a product important when deciding whether to purchase that product, according to the court. To state a CLRA class action, the consumer needed to show that all class members suffered some damage as a result of the alleged misrepresentation that the supplement was legal. Because these misrepresentations were made to class members, an inference of reliance arose as to the entire class.

The decision—Steroid Hormone Product Cases—appears at CCH State Unfair Trade Practices Law ¶31,995.

Wednesday, February 17, 2010





Price Fixing Claims Against Urethane Producers Take Shape

This posting was written by Darius Sturmer, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

In multidistrict litigation consisting of numerous putative class action lawsuits alleging a conspiracy among urethane chemical producers to fix prices of polyether polyol products, 56 opt-out plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a federal antitrust claim based on charges of conspiratorial conduct prior to 1999, the federal district court in Kansas City, Kansas, has ruled.

The court declined, however, to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims that were brought by European plaintiffs under European law and barred claims against two individual executives under the statute of limitations. The defendants’ motions to dismiss the claims were, therefore, granted in part and denied in part.

Pleading

The complaining purchasers corrected the pleading deficiencies that led to dismissal of their claims of a conspiracy existing prior to 1999 (2009-2 TRADE CASES ¶76,754), the court decided. In support of these pre-1999 conspiracy allegations, the plaintiffs’ second amended complaints included allegations of meetings and communications, involving specific participants and locations, in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.

Rejected was an argument that the plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient non-conclusory facts to state a plausible claim for the pre-1999 period because they did not allege the particular dates, participants, products discussed, markets discussed, agreements reached, and actions taken for each meeting or communication alleged for that time period, or the specific way in which all of the meetings and communications were connected. Requiring such allegations would impose an overly strict pleading standard, the court said.

Statute of Limitations

The court refused to dismiss the pre-1999 claims as time-barred on the ground that the complaining purchasers had failed to sufficiently allege affirmative acts of fraudulent concealment for that time period. The plaintiffs could rely on their allegations of false and pretextual announcements and letters by the defendants during that time period—such as a statement that prices were being increased because of rising costs—as acts of fraudulent concealment. They did not have to plead with particularity why the alleged misrepresentations were actually false, such as by alleging facts showing that costs were not in fact rising. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs did so plead by claiming that the price increases actually resulted from the alleged price fixing conspiracy instead of from rising costs.

The plaintiffs’ allegations of secret meetings, communications, and agreements to conceal the conspiracy also sufficed as affirmative acts of concealment, the court said. Claims against two individuals—who were executives for one of the chemical producing companies—were time-barred, however, because fraudulent concealment of the alleged conspiracy could not toll the limitations period sufficiently to render the claims timely, the court found.

The statute of limitations, as it related to the individual defendants, began to run, at the latest, when the plaintiffs admittedly discovered the existence of a claim against the individuals’ employer—November 23, 2004, the date upon which the first polyether polyols class action had been filed. This was approximately four years and four months before the individuals were first made parties to the suit.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that their claims should have been tolled for more than three more years because they did not discover that they had claims against the individuals until December 2007. Once the plaintiffs discovered in November 2004 that the employer was a member of the alleged conspiracy, their exercise of due diligence should have led them to investigate and discover the identity of additional individual defendants who acted on behalf of the employer, the court explained.

Four years was ample time to conduct that inquiry. As the plaintiffs themselves conceded, they actually did discover that they had claims against the individuals well within that window, the court noted. The plaintiffs offered no explanation for their subsequent failure to add those individuals as defendants to the suit at that time or within the year that followed.

European Law Claims

Finally, the court chose not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims brought by 26 European plaintiffs under European law. Litigation of the claims would raise novel and complex issues of European law, such as the issue of cross-jurisdictional tolling from the filing of a class action complaint and the issue of the effect of some nations’ joining the European Union (EU) only after the defendants’ price fixing conduct, the court said.

The court added that while it could determine any question of European law to the best of its ability, it would do so without the benefit of review by and instruction from the European Court of Justice and the European Commission. Given the state of European antitrust law, such law would be more ably interpreted and applied in Europe, in the court's view.

In addition, resolution of the European law claims in the United States would undermine principles of international comity. Dismissal of the claims would also have been appropriate under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the court concluded.

The decision is In re: Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 2010-1 Trade Cases ¶76,903.

Tuesday, February 16, 2010





Senate Banking Committee at Impasse over New Financial Consumer Protection Agency

This posting was written by Sarah Borchersen-Keto, CCH Washington Correspondent.

Democrats and Republicans on the Senate Banking Committee have failed to agree on the creation of a new financial consumer protection agency.

After reaching an impasse on the financial regulation overhaul with Ranking Member Richard Shelby (R-Alabama) on February 11, Committee Chairman Chris Dodd (D-Connecticut) tapped Senator Bob Corker (R-Tennessee) to lead negotiations on the Republican side.

The next day, Corker described the prospect of a stand-alone financial consumer protection agency as a “nonstarter.”

Corker said that consumer protection should be part of any financial regulatory reform package, but does not support the creation of a stand-alone agency for consumer protection. He suggested that the issue of consumer protection be set aside for the time being in order to focus on areas of consensus.

“I will work to see if we can find a way to enhance consumer protection without negatively impacting the safety and soundness of our financial system, and if we cannot, this will not be a bill I can support,” Corker stated. While agreeing to work with Dodd, he had not promised to support anything less than a reform bill that can attract bipartisan support.

Meanwhile, White House press spokesman Robert Gibbs reiterated President Obama’s support for strong consumer protection.

“The president still believes it is a great priority to have the independent authority to ensure that consumers in this reform are protected,” said Gibbs.

The spokesman failed to indicate whether President Obama would insist on the creation of a separate agency.

“Without knowing what exact vehicle might come in a bipartisan proposal from the Senate, obviously we would look at this assuming that strong consumer protections and authority was in that legislation.

Friday, February 12, 2010





U.S. Not Immune from Suit for False Advertising

This posting was written by William Zale, Editor of CCH Advertising Law Guide.

The United States was not immune from a software company's claim that the Department of Justice violated the Lanham Act by falsely representing that the company's TrustedAgent product would be included in DOJ’s information security solution for Federal Information Security Management Act compliance, the federal district court in the District of Columbia has ruled.

The Lanham Act was amended in 1999 to provide that the United States is not immune from suit for violations.

Commercial Advertising and Promotion

The software company (Trusted Integration, Inc.) stated a Lanham Act claim by asserting injury to its interstate business from the Department of Justice's allegedly false and deceptive advertisement of a product that it was selling to the company's potential customers, the court determined.

A Lanham Act claim may be based on a likelihood of damage from commercial advertising or promotion that misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of another person's goods, services, or commercial activities.

Trusted Integration alleged that government agencies sought to purchase their Federal Information Security Management Act compliance solution from the DOJ. DOJ’s advertisements to its potential customers allegedly portrayed TrustedAgent as “a key component,” even though DOJ had no intention of actually including it in the final product and had formally announced that it was selling its own alternative.

The company further alleged that the DOJ “repeatedly referenced” TrustedAgent in its demonstration to potential customers, and that this gave customers the “false sense” that TrustedAgent would be included in the final product.

The January 20 decision in Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States of America, Civil Action No. 09-898 (ESH), appaers at CCH Advertising Law Guide ¶63,737.

Thursday, February 11, 2010





NCAA Fails to Obtain Dismissal of Ex-College Basketball Player’s Antitrust Claims

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

Edward O’Bannon, a member of the University of California, Los Angeles men’s basketball team in the early 1990s, can proceed with antitrust claims against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and its “licensing arm” for excluding him and other college athletes from the licensing market, the federal district court in Oakland decided on February 8.

In the same decision, the court dismissed the similar but “truncated” antitrust claims of Craig Newsome, a member of Arizona State University football team from 1993 to 1994.

Use of Images

Under NCAA rules, student athletes are not compensated for the use of their images in NCAA licensed products. O’Bannon asserted that the actions of the NCAA and its licensing arm excluded him and other former student athletes from the collegiate licensing market. He claimed that, because the NCAA had rights to images of him from his collegiate career, the association, along with its co-conspirators, fix the price for the use of his image at “zero.”

O’Bannon pointed to a 2007 agreement between the NCAA and Thought Equity Motion, Inc. to offer “classic” college basketball games online that would allow the use of his image without compensation paid to him.

Conspiracy to Fix Prices, Boycott

O’Bannon sufficiently alleged a conspiracy to fix the price of former student athletes’ images at zero and to boycott former student athletes in the collegiate licensing market. The athlete pleaded sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case that the challenged conduct constituted a conspiracy to unreasonably restrain trade in the U.S. “collegiate licensing market,” under a rule of reason analysis.

A claim that the conduct restrained trade under a per se rule of illegality could not be pursued, however, because the allegations did not suggest the existence of a horizontal agreement to fix prices or to engage in a group boycott, according to the court.

The athlete alleged that NCAA rules enabled the association to enter into licensing agreements with companies that distribute products containing student athletes’ images. Student athletes allegedly did not consent to these agreements and did not receive compensation for the use of their images.

As a result, O’Bannon alleged, the NCAA’s actions excluded him and other former student athletes from the collegiate licensing market.

Newsome’s truncated complaint was dismissed, however, because it did not contain sufficient allegations to make out a prima facie case under a rule of reason analysis. Among other things, the football player did not plead a relevant market, the court explained.

Statute of Limitations

Although the complaint was filed more than a decade after O’Bannon played college basketball, the statute of limitations did not bar his antitrust claims, the court ruled. The 2007 agreement between the NCAA and a company to offer “classic” college basketball games online supported an inference that O’Bannon’s image was included in that agreement.

Text of the February 8, 2010, decision in Edward O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., No. C09-1967 CW, appears at 2010-1 Trade Cases ¶76,899.

Right of Publicity Action

In a separate case before the same judge, former Arizona State and Nebraska quarterback Samuel Michael Keller brought a class action complaint, asserting that Electronic Arts and the NCAA violated his right of publicity by using his likeness without consent in video games.

The court rejected EA’s and NCAA’s motions to dismiss Keller’s California right of publicity, civil conspiracy, and unfair competition law claims.

The February 8, 2010 opinion in Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, is reported at CCH Advertising Law Guide ¶63,760.

Wednesday, February 10, 2010





HIV Drug Maker Could Have Violated Federal Antitrust Law Through Price Hike

This posting was written by Darius Sturmer, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

HIV patients and their medical plans directly purchasing protease inhibitor (PI) drugs to fight the disease sufficiently alleged that the manufacturer of a PI drug marketed under the name “Norvir,” which had been found to boost the effectiveness of other PI drugs, could have violated federal antitrust law in several ways by raising the price of stand-alone Norvir over 400 percent, the federal district court in Oakland, California, has ruled. An omnibus motion to dismiss the claims was therefore denied.

Predatory Pricing

The drug maker, Abbott Laboratories, could have engaged in predatory pricing with regard to its own combined PI product (a drug named “Kaletra” that utilized Norvir with lopinavir) and the broader “boosted” market by raising the price of stand-alone Norvir so dramatically, in the court's view.

In maintaining its price for Kaletra, the manufacturer essentially offered a substantial discount on Norvir as a result of its bundling with lopinavir. The purchasers alleged that when the full amount of this discount was attributed to lopinavir—a competitive product in the “boosted” market—the resulting price was below the manufacturer's average variable cost to produce lopinavir.

This allegation supported their claim that the manufacturer engaged in unlawful predatory pricing through bundled discounting, the court found.

Exclusionary Conduct

Further, Abbott could have engaged in exclusionary conduct in violation of Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act by raising the price of stand-alone Norvir over 400 percent because the change disrupted a longstanding course of dealing. Liability under Sec. 2 could arise when a defendant voluntarily altered a course of dealing and anticompetitive malice motivated that conduct, the court explained.

The purchasers adequately alleged that Abbott had a duty to deal, according to the court. They claimed that the manufacturer had voluntarily engaged in licensing agreements with its competitors that allowed the competitors to market their PIs along with Norvir, and these agreements induced the competitors to rely on Norvir's availability on the market subject to normal, inflation-level price increases.

Given that the manufacturer's massive price hike on Norvir came about following the company's recognition that Kaletra would face new competition in the “boosted” PI market, and was not accompanied by a commensurate rise in its price for Kaletra, the increase could have been motivated by anticompetitive malice, the court determined.

Constructive Refusal to Deal

An argument that the allegations could not amount to an actionable refusal to deal because the manufacturer never refused outright to sell Norvir was rejected. Case law did not require outright refusal, the court noted. The price increase on Norvir placed other drug competitors in the untenable position of selling their boosted PIs at a price that could not compete with Kaletra; thus, the price increase signified a constructive refusal to deal.

Monopolization

The direct purchasers also adequately stated a claim that Abbott engaged in unlawful monopolization of the “boosting market” based on its reasonable pricing of Norvir for several years, thereby inducing its competitors to rely on the availability of the drug on these terms and to forgo development of their own PI boosters, the court added.

The conduct could have enabled the manufacturer to suppress competition in the boosting market. The court rejected arguments that the claims were not plausible and that the manufacturer's patent rights enabled it to license its product as it pleased. The complaining purchasers did not allege unlawful conduct arising from the manufacturer's licensing activity, but from its deception of its competitors, the court reasoned.

The decision is Safeway, Inc v. Abbott Laboratories, 2010-1 Trade Cases ¶76,896.

Tuesday, February 09, 2010





Justice Department Opposes New Google Book Settlement

This posting was written by Darius Sturmer, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

Despite the substantial progress reflected in the proposed amended settlement agreement in The Authors Guild Inc. et al. v. Google Inc., the U.S. Department of Justice has advised the federal district court in New York City that class certification, copyright, and antitrust issues remain.

The settlement agreement between Google and the authors and publishers aims to resolve copyright infringement claims brought against Google by The Authors Guild and five major publishers in 2005, arising from Google's efforts to digitally scan books contained in several libraries and to make them searchable on the Internet.

In a Statement of Interest filed with the court on February 4, the Justice Department said:

“Although the United States believes the parties have approached this effort in good faith and the amended settlement agreement is more circumscribed in its sweep than the original proposed settlement, the amended settlement agreement suffers from the same core problem as the original agreement: it is an attempt to use the class action mechanism to implement forward-looking business arrangements that go far beyond the dispute before the court in this litigation.”

On September 18, 2009, the Justice Department submitted views to the court on the original proposed settlement agreement.

At that time, it proposed that the parties consider changes to the agreement, such as imposing limitations on the most open-ended provisions for future licensing, eliminating potential conflicts among class members, providing additional protections for unknown rights holders, addressing the concerns of foreign publishers and authors, and providing a mechanism by which Google’s competitors can gain comparable access. (For further inforamtion on the Justice Department's objections, see September 21, 2009 posting on Trade Regulation Talk.)

In last week’s filing, the Justice Department recognized that the parties made substantial progress on a number of these issues.For example, the proposed amended settlement agreement:

Eliminates certain open-ended provisions that would have allowed Google to engage in certain unspecified future uses,

Appoints a fiduciary to protect rights holders of unclaimed works,

Reduces the number of foreign works in the settlement class, and

Removes a “most-favored nation” provision that would have guaranteed Google optimal license terms into the future.

The changes, however, do not fully resolve the government's concerns. The agency commented that the revised amended settlement agreement still confers significant and possibly anticompetitive advantages on Google as a single entity, thereby enabling the company to be the only competitor in the digital marketplace with the rights to distribute and otherwise exploit a vast array of works in multiple formats.

The Justice Department’s filing with court regarding the amended settlement is available here on the Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s web site.

Monday, February 08, 2010





Review of Horizontal Merger Guidelines Likely to Result in Update: Antitrust Division Official

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

A joint review of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines by the federal antitrust agencies is likely to result in an update of the guidelines, said Molly S. Boast, Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, on February 8.

Boast made the remark during the Practising Law Institute’s “Antitrust & the Deal, 2010” program in New York City.

The Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission are working together to determine whether the Guidelines (CCH Trade Regulation Reporter ¶13,104), which were issued in 1992 and revised in 1997 to add an efficiencies discussion, should be updated to reflect current practice and economic thinking.

The process has included five workshops, which were conducted over the last two months, as well as an internal review of staffers at the agencies.

A majority of the workshop participants and the staff—but not an overwhelming majority—have expressed a preference for an update, Boast noted. She did not offer a publication date for the update.

One of the goals of the guidelines is to provide transparency or insight into how the government conducts its merger analysis. According to Boast, the current guidelines do not reflect precisely how things are done at the agencies.

A consensus has developed around a need for a flexible analysis under the guidelines. There is a growing view that merger analysis should not be based on a rigid, sequential approach.Methods for determining market concentration could also be updated, according to Boast.

An update could revise the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) thresholds to express accurately how the agencies use HHIs. There could be a move to deemphasize HHIs, the official suggested.

Friday, February 05, 2010





California’s Tax Authority Joins New York’s in Going After Franchisors

This posting was written by Bruce S. Schaeffer of Franchise Valuations, Ltd., co-author of CCH Franchise Regulation and Damages.

As most franchise practitioners know by now, New York recently enacted a statute amending Sec. 1136 of the Tax Law to mandate that all franchisors file information returns giving the names and addresses of all their franchisees in the state. The legislation also provides that information on all payments from franchisees to franchisors and records of all sales from franchisors to their franchisees will be required.

An even more onerous situation has evolved in California, where the California Franchise Tax Board has begun contacting non-resident franchisors about their nexus status for tax purposes.

State regulators are taking the position that non-resident franchisors must either register as resident corporations with the Secretary of State or have their California franchisees withhold seven percent of royalty payments.

Section 18662-2 of California's tax code is being cited as justification for this interpretation. Specifically:

Withholding at source is also required in the case of rentals or royalties for the use of, or for the privilege of using in this State, patents, copyrights, secret processes and formulas, good will, trademarks, brands, franchises, and other like property of such intangible property having a business or taxable situs as defined in Regs. 17951-1 through 17951-5, 17952 and 17953 in this State, and payments of prizes, premiums, rewards, winnings, etc., to nonresidents

“Constructive” Wrongful Termination, Attorneys Fees, and Expert Fees

On occasion, the issue under wrongful termination statutes is whether or not there has been a “constructive” wrongful termination. A recent New Jersey case is instructive.

In Maintainco, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift (CCH Business Franchise Guide ¶14,195) a forklift manufacturer's forcing out an authorized dealer was held to have amounted to “constructive” termination in violation of the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act (NJFPA). The manufacturer argued that the NJFPA prohibited only actual terminations; thus, because the dealer was never terminated, there was no violation.

However, the record established that the manufacturer’s officers were well aware that the NJFPA prohibited them from terminating the dealer unless they could establish "good cause," and the court rejected the manufacturer's assertion that the dealer had breached a best efforts provision in the parties' agreement.

The court held that a dealer's loss of an exclusive territory, in and of itself, could qualify as a constructive termination. Therefore, the trial court’s ruling and its award of compensatory damages for lost profits to the dealer in the amount of $679,414 were affirmed. Additionally, the trial court's substantial award of attorney fees to the dealer in the amount of $3,533,642 was also upheld, but an award of $477,611 in expert witness fees was reversed.

Termination: The Insurance Agent Cases

It started with a Connecticut case against Nationwide Insurance, alleging that a terminated agent was entitled to the protection afforded a franchisee under Connecticut law. It was imperfectly resolved. There were similar cases in Missouri and Washington.

This was recently followed by Michigan, in a case of first impression, holding that an insurance agent could maintain a cause of action under the Michigan Franchise Investment Law if it could show it paid a franchise fee (which the court thought to be unlikely but could not so rule on the pleadings).Bucciarelli v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.(E.D. Mich. 2009) CCH Business Franchise Guide ¶14,200.

In another insurance agent case, a California appellate court overturned a trial court holding that the relationship between an insurance company and one of its agents was that of franchisor/franchisee, entitling the agent to the protections of the California Franchise Investment Law and the California Franchise Relations Act. The court found there was no actual, present controversy, which was a requirement to bring the claim as a declaratory judgment action.

Thus, the trial court erred in reaching the merits of the agent’s claims and was ordered to vacate its summary judgment to the insurance company on the merits (Business Franchise Guide 2008-2009 New Developments Transfer Binder ¶13,897). The court was directed to issue a new order granting summary judgment on the sole ground that declaratory relief was not appropriate. Vice v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)CCH Business Franchise Guide ¶14,219.
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Additional information on the issues discussed above is available in CCH Franchise Regulation and Damages by Byron E. Fox and Bruce S. Schaeffer.

Thursday, February 04, 2010





FTC Proposes Rule for Combating Rogue Mortgage Assistance Relief Services

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

Providers of mortgage assistance relief services—or MARS—would be prohibited from engaging in unfair and deceptive practices, under a proposed Federal Trade Commission rule announced today.

Among the prohibited conduct would be the unfair practice of charging up-front fees for foreclosure rescue and mortgage modification services.

In its notice for proposed rulemaking (NPR), the FTC is seeking public comment on a rule that would regulate for-profit providers of mortgage assistance relief services (16 CFR Part 322).

“Mortgage assistance services based on negotiating with the lender or servicer to obtain a loan modification or some other type of foreclosure relief have mushroomed in the past two years,” according to the Commission. During that time, the agency has filed 28 law enforcement actions against these providers.

Misrepresentation of Services, Results

In these enforcement actions, the FTC has alleged that MARS providers misrepresented the services that they will perform and the results they will obtain for consumers.

In addition, some providers misrepresented that they were closely affiliated with the government, various nonprofit programs, or the consumer’s own lender or servicer. Some have also claimed that they offer legal services, when attorneys were either not employed at the company or provided little or no legal work for consumers.

MARS Defined

The proposed rule would define a “mortgage assistance relief service” to include “any service, plan or program, offered or provided in exchange for consideration on behalf of the consumer, that is represented, expressly or by implication, to assist or attempt to assist the consumer” in negotiating a modification of any term of a loan or obtain other types of relief to avoid delinquency or foreclosure.

According to the FTC, the definition “is intended to apply to every solution that may be marketed by covered providers to financially distressed consumers as a means to avoid foreclosure or save their homes.”

Prohibited Representations

The rule would prohibit misrepresentations of any material aspect of any mortgage assistance relief service. A non-exclusive list of claims that could violate the proposed rule includes:

 Likelihood and time to provide services or obtain results;

 Affiliation with public or private entities;

 Payment and other obligations under existing mortgage loans;

 Refund and cancellation policies; and

 The completion of promised services.

Required Disclosures

MARS providers would be required under the rule to make clear and prominent disclosures in an effort to assist consumers in making decisions about mortgage assistance relief services. For-profit status would need to be disclosed. A disclaimer disavowing any affiliation with the government or the consumer’s lender would be needed. The total amount consumers would have to pay for the provider’s services would have to be disclosed.

In addition, providers would need to disclose that there was no guarantee that consumers’ lenders would agree to change their loan terms.

Prohibition on Collection of Advance Fees

The Commission proposes to ban MARS providers from requiring that consumers pay in advance for their services. A large number of those responding to the Commission’s s June 2009 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) urged the Commission to propose a rule prohibiting or restricting the collection of fees for mortgage relief services until the promised services were completed.

“The Commission believes that requiring that consumers pay advance fees for mortgage assistance relief services meets the standard for an unfair practice under Section 5(n) of the FTC Act,” according to the NPR. The NPR noted that the Commission reached the same conclusion in the Telemarketing Sales Rule with respect to the charging of an advance fee for credit repair services, money recovery services, and guaranteed loans or other extensions of credit.

The FTC, however, did provide some alternatives to a ban on advance fees. The agency asked whether it should: (1) limit or cap advance fees instead of banning them outright; (2) allow MARS providers to use independent third-party escrow accounts to hold fees until they achieve the results; and (3) include a right of rescission.

Assisting and Facilitating

The rule would also reach those who furnish key support to MARS providers engaged in unlawful conduct. The proposed rule would prohibit any person from providing “substantial assistance or support” to a MARS provider if that person knows or consciously avoids knowing that the provider is violating any provision of the proposed rule.

The NPR is available here on the FTC website and will be published in the Federal Register. Further details will appear in the CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.