Showing posts with label enforcement priorities. Show all posts
Showing posts with label enforcement priorities. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 30, 2009





New Administration Signals New Enforcement Priorities for 2009 Antitrust Division

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

A new administration meant new leadership and new enforcement priorities at the Department of Justice Antitrust Division in 2009.

Former FTC Commissioner Christine A. Varney was confirmed by the Senate in April to serve as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division. Soon thereafter, Varney took steps to reverse some of the policies set by the prior administration.

First, in May, Varney withdrew a September 2008, Antitrust Division report, entitled “Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of theSherman Act” (CCH Trade Regulation Reporter ¶50,231), which examined whether and when specific types of single-firm conduct violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

The antitrust chief said that withdrawing the report “is a shift in philosophy and the clearest way to let everyone know that the Antitrust Division will be aggressively pursuing cases where monopolists try to use their dominance in the marketplace to stifle competition and harm consumers.”

Patent “Reverse Payments”

The current Antitrust Division has also taken a tougher stand on patent litigation settlements involving a “reverse payments.” In July, the Department of Justice filed a brief with the U.S. Court of Appeals in New York City, considering an action challenging a settlement agreement between drug maker Bayer AG and the generic defendant Barr Laboratories, Inc.

The Justice Department said that a patent litigation settlement involving a “reverse payment” to the alleged drug patent infringer in exchange for its agreement to withdraw its challenge to the patent and delay bringing its generic drug to market should be viewed as presumptively unlawful.

The move brings the Justice Department’s position closer to that espoused by the FTC on “pay-for-delay” patent settlement agreements between drug makers.

Horizontal Merger Guidelines

Another example of increased coordination between the Antitrust Division and the FTC was the September announcement to explore the possibility of revising the agencies’ joint horizontal merger guidelines. The agencies kicked off workshops in December to consider changes to the guidelines. The workshops will continue in January 2010.

Mergers and Acquisitions

Despite the Antitrust Division’s efforts to strengthen antitrust enforcement, the agency still faced criticism. Some in the tech sector took issue with the Justice Department’s decision in August not to challenge the merger of Oracle Corporation and Sun Microsystems Inc., which is valued at $7.4 billion.

Since the Justice Department’s announcement approving the deal, Oracle has offered some proposed remedies in an effort to satisfy the competition concerns of the European Commission regarding the maintenance of MySQL as an open source database in competition with Oracle’s proprietary databases following the merger.

Cartel Enforcement

In 2009, as in past years, the Justice Department continued to make cartel enforcement a priority. The Justice Department continued to obtain guilty pleas from companies and executives in connection with investigations into conspiracies to fix cargo rates for international air shipments and to fix prices for Thin Film Transistor-Liquid Crystal Display panels.

A new focus for the Antitrust Division in 2009 was bid rigging in the municipal bonds industry

Tuesday, May 19, 2009





Varney Discusses Antitrust Enforcement in Distressed Economy

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter, and John W. Arden.

Antitrust chief Christine A. Varney made headlines last week when she announced, in a May 11 speech, the withdrawal of the Antitrust Division’s controversial report on single firm conduct. (See Trade Regulation Talk, May 11, 2009).

However, Varney’s comments on other significant issues—from the role of antitrust enforcement in a distressed economy to the Antitrust Division’s enforcement agenda—were not widely reported.

In a speech to the Center for American Progress, the Assistant Attorney General suggested that “a combination of factors, including ineffective government regulation, ill-considered deregulatory measures, and inadequate antitrust oversight contributed to the current conditions.” In light of the state of the economy, antitrust enforcers can no longer “sit on the sidelines.”

Prior Economic Crises

Varney noted that the federal government’s response to the Great Depression was to pass legislation, such as the National Industrial Recovery Act, that effectively foreclosed competition by setting industry prices and wages, establishing production quotas, and imposing restrictions on entry.

“Competition was relegated to the sidelines, as the welfare of firms took priority over the welfare of consumers,” she said. “It is not surprising that the industrial codes resulted in restricted output, higher prices, and reduced consumer purchasing power.”

By 1937, the Roosevelt Administration got back in the game of antitrust enforcement on a nationwide scale. This newly vigorous enforcement became a cornerstone of the New Deal’s economic agenda.

Lessons Learned

“The lessons learned from this historical example are twofold,” she said. “First, there is no adequate substitute for a competitive market, particularly during times of economic distress. Second, vigorous antitrust enforcement must play a significant role in the Government’s response to economic crises to ensure that markets remain competitive.”

In recent years, firms have been given “room to run with the idea that markets self-police and that enforcement authorities should wait for the markets to self-correct.” However, it is clear that this self-correction has not occurred, the official said. Instead, markets are distorted, firms fail, and American consumers are failing with them.

“I believe that these extreme conditions require a recalibration of economic and legal analysis and theories, and a clearer plan for action,” Varney stated.

Section 2 Enforcement

Varney spoke of her intention to aggressively pursue enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and explained the reasons for withdrawing the 2008 report, entitled “Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.”

“In my view, the greatest weakness of the Section 2 Report is that it raises many hurdles to Government antitrust enforcement,” she said. It raises the concern that the enforcers and courts may fail to distinguish between anticompetitive acts and lawful conduct and their actions may lead to “overdeterrence” of potentially procompetitive conduct, she observed.

“I do not share these concerns. I strongly believe that antitrust enforcers are able to separate the wheat from the chaff in identifying exclusionary and predatory acts. As Judge Posner explained, ‘antitrust doctrine is supple enough to take in stride the competitive issues presented by the new economy.’”

She also noted that the report went too far in evaluating the importance of preserving possible efficiencies and underestimated the importance of redressing exclusionary and predatory acts that harm competition, distort markets, and increase barriers to entry.

Rather than any specific test to govern Section 2 analysis, Varney recommended that the Antitrust Division go “back to basics” in evaluating single-firm conduct within the fundamental principles of antitrust enforcement.

Section 1 Cases

Varney added that “continued criminal and civil enforcement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act will also be an important part of the Antitrust Division’s response to the distressed economy.”

“With the higher levels of concentration and economic instability, markets are increasingly vulnerable to collusion and other fraudulent activity,” the Assistant Attorney General said.

On the civil front, the new antitrust chief will emphasize both merger and non-merger investigations and explore vertical theories in other new areas, such as those arising in high-tech and Internet-based markets.

Besides enforcing antitrust laws, the Division will be asked to contribute expertise to the Obama Administration’s broad reforms over numerous industries. “Indeed part of our efforts will be to foster inter-agency discussions regarding competition-related issues posed by existing and proposed regulations and policies, and to play an active role in competition advocacy.”

Text of the speech (“Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era”) appears at CCH Trade Regulation Reporter ¶50,242 and here on the Department of Justice Antitrust Division website.