Showing posts with label recusal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label recusal. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 02, 2010





Intel’s Motion for Disqualification of Commissioner Rejected

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

The FTC on January 19 issued an opinion in which it denied Intel Corporation’s motion to disqualify Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch from participating in adjudicative proceedings against the computer chip maker, even though Commissioner Rosch served as Intel’s primary outside antitrust counsel from about 1987 until mid-1993.

The Commission also released a statement by Commissioner Rosch, explaining his decision not to recuse himself in the matter. That statement was dated December 18, 2009—just two days after the agency issued its complaint against Intel for monopolizing the markets for Central Processing Units (CPUs) and creating a monopoly in the markets for graphics processing units (GPUs). (For further information on the FTC complaint against Intel, see the December 16, 2009 posting on Trade Regulation Talk.)

Matters Not “Substantially Related”

In an opinion written by FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz, the Commission concluded that the current matter, which concerned conduct from 1999 to the present, and the matters upon which Commissioner Rosch previously advised Intel were not “substantially related.”

The FTC’s previous investigation in which Commissioner Rosch represented Intel principally focused on conduct that took place from 1985 through 1990. There was no pertinent nexus between the facts at issue in the prior representation and the current Intel matter, the Commission said.

Intel also failed to identify any basis for a reasonable person to question Commissioner Rosch’s ability to be impartial in adjudicating the proceeding, according to the Commission.

Commissioner Rosch’s Statement

In his separate statement, Commissioner Rosch explained his reasons for declining to recuse himself from further participation in the Intel proceeding. The Commissioner noted that disqualification was not supported under applicable standards for judges and FTC Commissioners, government ethical regulations, and California’s Rules of Professional Conduct.

Moreover, the Commissioner questioned Intel’s decision not to object to his participation in proceedings sooner. Intel did not move to disqualify Commissioner Rosch until the day before the Commission’s final vote to pursue administrative litigation. Over a period of approximately 18 months, “Intel never suggested (nor did any other participant for that matter) that there was any basis for disqualification,” Commissioner Rosch noted.

The Commission opinion and order denying motion for disqualification, In the Matter of Intel Corp., Dkt. 9341, appears here on the FTC website. Further details will appear in CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

Wednesday, November 11, 2009





NFL Cannot Remove Judge from Oversight Authority for Antitrust Consent Decree

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

A federal district court judge can continue to oversee a 1993 settlement agreement that resolved an antitrust class action brought on behalf of professional football players against the National Football League, the U.S. Court of Appeals in St. Louis decided yesterday.

1993 Settlement

In April 1993, Hon. David S. Doty, U.S. District Judge for the District of Minnesota, issued an order (1993-2 Trade Cases ¶70,299), approving the settlement resolving a dispute arising out of various NFL player rules that had been the source of numerous disputes between players and the NFL.

Pursuant to the terms of the settlement, the court retained jurisdiction over its enforcement through appointment of a special master, who heard disputes on an expedited basis, subject to review by the court. In the years that followed, the court resolved numerous disputes over the terms of the settlement agreement and parallel Collective Bargaining Agreement that govern player employment in the NFL.

Present Dispute

In response to a decision by the district court against one of the member teams, the NFL filed a motion to terminate the district court’s oversight of the consent decree. In addition, the league requested that Judge Doty remove himself from the case because of a perception that he was biased. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals in St. Louis has now affirmed.

Modification of Settlement Agreement

It was not an abuse of discretion for the federal district court to deny the NFL’s motion under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to end the court's oversight of the settlement agreement, according to the appellate court. The league did not establish any changed circumstances warranting modification of the consent decree.

The NFL unsuccessfully argued that the district court’s oversight of the settlement agreement was no longer permissible because it amounted to unlawful meddling in the collective bargaining process, which was prohibited by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 1996-1 Trade Cases ¶71,445. Brown did not constitute a change in the law requiring modification of the settlement agreement, the court explained.

Also rejected was the NFL's argument that the recertification of the players union, the resumption of collective bargaining, and the diminishing number of original class members who continued to play football constituted circumstances that warranted modification of the settlement agreement.

Recusal

Judge Doty was not required to recuse himself from overseeing enforcement of the settlement agreement, the appellate court also held. The NFL argued that the judge should have recused himself because of his comments in the press and ex parte meetings with NFL Players Association representatives.

The judge's comments referring to rulings that he made many years earlier and relating to matters long since resolved would not be interpreted by the average person as reflecting bias, it was held. Moreover, the judge’s statement that he had laughed at an NFL request that the court end its oversight of the settlement agreement did not demonstrate that the judge failed to take the request seriously. The district court responded to the request with an eight-page order that addressed the legal issues that the NFL raised.

To the extent that Judge Doty’s statements were jocular and informal, the average observer would see that as reflective of his down-to-earth approach to resolving the oft-contentious disputes brought to him by the parties, the appellate court explained.

The appellate court did note, however, that “although we do not believe that the articles created a reasonable perception of bias . . . the district judge would have been well advised not to opine publicly about his role in enforcing an ongoing consent decree.”

Ex Parte Meetings

Finally, to the extent that the league relied on the ex parte meetings to support recusal, its motion was untimely. Although the NFL had been aware of the court's practice of exchanging pleasantries in chambers with representatives of the players association for a number of years, it voiced a complaint only after receiving an adverse decision with which it strongly disagreed, according to the appellate court.

The November 10 decision in Reggie White, et al. v. National Football League, will appear at 2009-2 Trade Cases ¶76,790.