Monday, April 12, 2010





Utah Enacts Phishing, Pharming, Spyware Prohibitions

This posting was written by Thomas A. Long, Editor of CCH Privacy Law in Marketing.

The new Utah “E-Commerce Integrity Act,” which was signed by Governor Gary R. Herbert on March 26, 2010, prohibits certain Internet-related conduct, including phishing and pharming. The law (Senate Bill 26) also repeals Utah’s “Spyware Control Act” and enacts new restrictions on the use of spyware.

“Phishing” is defined by the law as making a communication under false pretenses purporting to be by or on behalf of a legitimate business and using that communication to induce another person to provide identification information or property.

“Pharming” is described as the creation or operation of a website that falsely represents itself to be associated with a legitimate business and that induces others to provide identifying information or property. The statute prohibits the use of spyware to collect, through intentionally deceptive means, personally identifiable information.

Civil Action, Remedies

A civil action may be brought against violators of the phishing and pharming provisions by an Internet service provider that is adversely affected by the violation; an owner of a website, computer server, or a trademark that is used without authorization in the violation; or the state attorney general. Remedies include actual damages or a civil penalty of up to $150,000 per violation.

Civil actions to enforce the law’s spyware provisions may be brought by the state attorney general, an Internet service provider, or a software company that expends resources in good faith to assist authorized users harmed by a violation, as well as a trademark owner whose mark is used to deceive authorized users.

Damages, Fees, Costs

Plaintiffs may seek actual damages and liquidated damages of at least $1,000 per violation, not to exceed $1 million for a pattern or practice of violations, and attorney’s fees and costs. Courts are authorized to award treble damages for willful and knowing violations.

Utah’s “E-Commerce Integrity Act” will take effect on July 1, 2010. Text of the law appears at CCH Privacy Law in Marketing ¶34,442.

Friday, April 09, 2010





UK Commissioner May Order Fines for Serious Breaches of Data Protection Act

This posting was written by Thomas A. Long, Editor of CCH Privacy Law in Marketing.

New enforcement powers aimed at helping the United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) deter data security breaches came into effect under UK law on April 6, 2010.

The ICO is now authorized to order organizations to pay up to £500,000 as a penalty for serious violations of the Data Protection Act (CCH Privacy Law in Marketing ¶49,100).

The ICO may impose a monetary penalty notice if a data controller has seriously contravened the Act’s data protection principles and if the contravention was likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress.

In addition, the contravention must either have been deliberate or the data controller must have known or ought to have known that there was a risk that a contravention would occur and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent it.

According to the ICO, the power to impose a monetary penalty is part of the ICO’s overall regulatory tool kit, which includes the power to serve an enforcement notice and the power to prosecute those involved in the unlawful trade in confidential personal data.

Further information regarding the new enforcement powers appears here on the ICO website.

Thursday, April 08, 2010





Magazine Telemarketers Enjoined from Violating FTC Act, Telemarketing Sales Rule

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

The federal district court in Las Vegas has a “small surprise” for some telemarketers who sold magazines to consumers at their places of employment.

Telemarketers for Publishers Business Services, Inc. purportedly began their sales pitches with “I just wanted to ask you a few questions on your personal buying habits and if you could help me we have a small surprise for you . . . .” According to the court, the telemarketers’ surprise was a bill for hundreds of dollars for supposedly free magazine subscriptions lasting up to 60 months.

Yesterday, the court issued a permanent injunction against the company prohibiting violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR). The consumer protection agency’s request for monetary relief will be considered at a later date.

The telemarketers' “lead” calls, “verification” calls, and subsequent calls to obtain payment all violated federal law, the court held. There was evidence that consumers believed that the telemarketers’ offers were either free or for a nominal amount, and that there was no long-term obligation or no obligation at all. While some of the challenged representations might have been literally true, the overall net impression of the representations had a tendency to mislead consumers into agreeing to long-term obligations to pay the telemarketers hundreds of dollars, the court decided. Further, the subsequent communications to induce payment used misleading representations.

Telemarketing Sales Rule's Business-to-Business Exemption

The telemarketers argued that the business-to-business exemption of the TSR shielded them from the rule’s requirements, because they only called businesses. The court noted that the TSR does not define “business” and that no other court had addressed what “business” meant in the context of the TSR exemption.

Under a natural and plain reading of the exemption, a telemarketer was exempt when it solicited a business regarding purchases on behalf of the business, the court explained. The limited scope of the exemption was apparent, to exclude only telemarketing calls to businesses for business purchases. However, PBS was calling consumers at work. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that their interpretation of the business-to-business exemption was consistent with the industry usage of the term, the FTC’s published regulatory intent, and congressional intent.

The texts of the April 7, 2010, order and permanent injunction in FTC v. Publishers Business Services, Inc., 2:08-cv-00620, appears at 2010-1 Trade Cases ¶76,955.

The FTC’s May 2008 complaint in the matter appears here on the FTC's website.





Senator Calls for Close FTC Scrutiny of Google’s Acquisition of Mobile Ad Provider AdMob


This posting was written by Cheryl Beise, Editor of CCH Guide to Computer Law.

A key U.S. Senator this week urged the Federal Trade Commission to closely scrutinize Google’s proposed acquisition of mobile advertising service provider AdMob. Senator Herb Kohl (Wisconsin), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, expressed his concerns in an April 6 letter to FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz. Shortly after Google announced its acquisition of AdMob for $750 million last November, the FTC requested further information.

Senator Kohl pointed out that the deal’s critics argue that the combination would allow Google to “leverage its dominance of PC-based search advertising market into the emerging mobile advertising market.” Google-AdMob’s combined market dominance potentially could result in higher mobile advertising prices and lower revenues for applications developers, Kohl said.

Google and AdMob contend that the mobile advertising market is too nascent to determine if any one transaction will result in dominance. According to Senator Kohl, however, the stakes are too high to avoid protecting competition in an emerging market where revenues are predicted to leap from $416 million in 2009 to $1.56 billion in 2013. “[T]he incipiency of the smart phone advertising market is not in itself a reason for the FTC to desist from taking any necessary action to enforce the antitrust laws or protect competition,” Senator Kohl wrote. Advertising accounted for 97% of Google’s $23.7 billion in revenues in 2009.

Senator Kohl also urged the Commission to ensure that consumers’ privacy would be safeguarded if the deal is approved. “[T]he combined firm will gain access to a treasure trove of data on millions of consumers’ behavior, search and product preferences,” Senator Kohl noted.

Senator Kohl’s letter arrived amidst news reports that FTC lawyers are preparing to challenge the Google-AdMob deal on antitrust grounds. Any action taken by the FTC would need to be cleared by the agency's Bureau of Competition and approved by the FTC Commissioners.

Wednesday, April 07, 2010





Challenge to Consummated Acquisition in Dairy Market Survives Motion to Dismiss

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

The federal district court in Milwaukee today refused to dismiss one of the two counts in a complaint filed by the U.S. Department of Justice and the States of Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin against Dean Foods Company for violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act. In the complaint, the government challenged Dean's consummated acquisition of the Consumer Products Division of Foremost Farms USA, a dairy cooperative headquartered in central Wisconsin.

The government alleged that the acquisition adversely affected two types of markets: the markets for the sale of school milk to individual school districts located throughout the State of Wisconsin and the Upper Peninsula (UP) of Michigan (Count 1); and the market for the sale of fluid milk to purchasers, such as retailers, distributors, food service companies, located in Wisconsin, the UP, and northeastern Illinois (Count 2).

Dean, the country's largest processor and distributor of milk and other dairy products, sought to dismiss Count 2. Dean "critique[d] the premise on which plaintiffs' proposed geographic market is based, and criticize[d] the sufficiency with which it is defined." Dean argued that the government improperly defined the geographic market based on the region in which Dean and Foremost competed for fluid milk sales prior to the acquisition. While a geographic market was comprised of the area where customers look to buy a product and not the region in which the seller attempts to sell its product, that did not mean that the geographic area where the parties competed was not the relevant geographic market, the court explained.

The court also rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the pleading of the relevant geographic market. The government's geographic market definition was based on a hypothetical monopolist's ability to impose a small but significant and nontransitory increase in price ("SSNIP") on certain targeted buyers. The test is described in section 1.22 of the joint Federal Trade Commission/U.S. Department of Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The court noted that the Merger Guidelines were not binding, but that they were considered to be persuasive authorities.

The court accepted the geographic market despite Dean's contentions that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently pled: (1) the identities and particular locations of customers that defendant could target for price discrimination; (2) that targeted customers could not defeat a SSNIP by turning to more distant sellers; and (3) that targeted customers could not defeat a SSNIP through arbitrage. The court refused to apply the highly specific pleading standard advocated by Dean.

The text of the April 7, 2010, order in U.S. v. Dean Foods Co., Case 2:10-cv-00059-JPS, appears at 2010-1 Trade Cases ¶76,952.

Tuesday, April 06, 2010





Ramirez, Brill Sworn In as New Federal Trade Commissioners

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

Edith Ramirez and Julie Brill were sworn in as new Federal Trade Commissioners by FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz on April 5 and 6, respectively. Ramirez filled an open position on the Commission, and Brill now occupies the vacancy created by the departure of Pamela Jones Harbour. Harbour, whose term ended last September, resigned effective April 6.

Prior to joining the FTC, Ramirez was a partner at Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP in Los Angeles. Before joining Quinn Emanuel, she was an associate at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, in Los Angeles and clerked for the Hon. Alfred T. Goodwin in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Ramirez’s term will expire on September 25, 2015.

Brill comes to the FTC from the North Carolina Department of Justice, where she served as Senior Deputy Attorney General and Chief of Consumer Protection and Antitrust. Prior to her move to the North Carolina Department of Justice, Brill was an Assistant Attorney General for Consumer Protection and Antitrust for the State of Vermont for over 20 years. Brill’s term will expire on September 25, 2016.

Further information about the swearing in of Commissioner Ramirez appears here on the FTC website. Further information on the swearing in of Commissioner Brill appears here.

A statement from Commissioner Harbour on her resignation appears here.

Monday, April 05, 2010





Cleaning Service Franchisees Qualify as “Employees” Under Massachusetts Law

This posting was written by John W. Arden.

Cleaning service franchisees were employees—rather than independent contractors—within the Massachusetts Independent Contractor statute, according to the federal district court in Boston.

Under the statute (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, §148B), an individual performing a service is considered an employee unless:

(1) the individual is free from control and direction in connection with the performance of the service, both under his contract for the performance of service and in fact; and

(2) the service is performed outside the usual course of the business of the employer; and

(3) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business of the same nature as that involved in the service performed.

The franchisor (Coverall North America, Inc.) failed to carry its burden of establishing all three elements, the court held. In particular, the franchisor failed to establish the second prong of the test—that the franchisees were “performing services that are part of an independent, separate, and distinct business from that of the employer.”

Cleaning Business v. Franchising Business

In attempting to establish that the franchisor and its franchisees are distinct businesses, the franchisor argued that it is not in the commercial cleaning business, but is in the franchising business, the court noted.

The franchisor maintained that it sells franchises and trains and supports the franchises, but neither cleans any establishment nor employs anyone who cleans any establishment. It further claimed that “numerous courts have accepted that the functions and business of a franchisor are separate and distinct from those of a franchisee and that their shared economic interest does not make one the employer of the other.”

The court agreed that there have been rulings that shared economic interests do not make one the employer of the other, but that such rulings did not establish the conclusion that the functions and business of a franchisor are separate and distinct from those of a franchisee.

“Coverall’s argument is not unlike arguments made by other employers in Massachusetts who also required their employees to sign agreements stating that they were independent contractors,” the court stated.

“Ponzi Scheme”

According to the court, “[d]escribing franchising as a business in itself, as Coverall seeks to do, sounds vaguely like a description for a modified Ponzi scheme—a company that does not earn money from the sale of goods or services, but from taking in more money from unwitting franchisees to make payments to the previous franchisees.”

Such a description does not apply to the franchisor, the court said. As a result of the expenditure of time, skill, effort, and money, Coverall developed the system used by its franchisees. It trains franchisees and provides them with uniforms, contracts with all customers, and receives a percentage of revenue earned on every cleaning service.

“These undisputed facts establish that Coverall sell cleaning services, the same services provided by these plaintiffs,” the court found.

Because the franchisees did not perform services outside the usual course of Coverall’s business, the franchisor failed to establish that the franchisees were independent contractors, in the court’s view.

The decision is Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc., Civil Action No. 07-10287-WGY, March 23, 2010. It will appear in the CCH Business Franchise Guide.

Reaction

In a March 29 news release, the International Franchise Association (IFA) said that the ruling will “severely impact the ability of franchise businesses to operate, create jobs and provide millions in economic output” in Massachusetts.

“We feel the judge did not take fully into account the unique attributes of franchising and the federal regulatory oversight of the franchise business model,” said David French, IFA Vice President of Government Relations.

“Wrongfully defining franchisees as employees of the franchisor instead of business owners, as the ruling does, threatens the viability of franchising as a business model in Massachusetts and will likely lead to franchise companies ceasing operations,” he stated.

The IFA is supporting legislation filed in Massachusetts that would change the independent contractor law to require violation of all three prongs for an entity to be deemed a “misclassified worker.”

Friday, April 02, 2010





Evidence That eBay’s Ads Misled Consumers Merits Another Look

This posting was written by William Zale, Editor of CCH Advertising Law Guide.

In light of evidence that online marketplace eBay knew that “Tiffany” products advertised and sold on eBay often were counterfeit, the U.S. Court of Appeals in New York ordered a trial court to take a fresh look at whether eBay’s advertising was likely to mislead or confuse consumers in violation of the Lanham Act.

The court remanded the case to the federal district court in New York City, which had held that the evidence at trial did not support Tiffany’s claims that eBay’s advertising violated the Lanham Act (CCH Advertising Law Guide ¶63,019).

Advertising of "Tiffany" Goods

eBay advertised the sale of Tiffany goods on its website in various ways. Among other things, eBay provided hyperlinks to “Tiffany,” “Tiffany & Co. under $150,” “Tiffany & Co.,” “Tiffany Rings,” and “Tiffany & Co. under $50.” eBay also purchased advertising space on search engines, in some instances providing a link to eBay's site and exhorting the reader to “Find tiffany items at low prices.”

Yet the trial court found, and eBay does not deny, that “eBay certainly had generalized knowledge that Tiffany products sold on eBay were often counterfeit,” the appellate court observed.

eBay did not infringe or dilute Tiffany’s trademarks, and the advertising was not literally false because some genuine Tiffany merchandise was offered for sale on eBay. However, the reasons given for rejecting the claim that the advertising was misleading were inadequate, the court held.

Fair Use

Even if eBay’s use of Tiffany's mark was a nominative fair use, it did not follow that eBay did not use the mark in a misleading advertisement, the court reasoned. The mere fact that the incorporation of another’s brand in an advertisement may be a permissible fair use under trademark law did not preclude a claim that the advertisement was false or misleading.

Knowledge

eBay could not rely on its lack of knowledge as to which particular listings on its website offered counterfeit Tiffany goods. This fact, while relevant to the question of contributory trademark infringement, shed little light on whether the advertisements were misleading insofar as they implied the genuineness of Tiffany goods on eBay's site, the court said.

Sellers’ Fraud

Finally, the court was unconvinced by the theory that eBay's advertisements were misleading only because the sellers of counterfeits made them so by offering inauthentic Tiffany goods. This consideration was relevant to Tiffany's direct infringement claim, but less relevant, if relevant at all, to the question of whether the advertising was likely to mislead or confuse consumers.

It was true that eBay did not itself sell counterfeit Tiffany goods. Only the fraudulent vendors did, and that in part was why eBay did not infringe Tiffany's mark.

But eBay did affirmatively advertise the goods sold through its site as Tiffany merchandise. The law required that eBay be held accountable for the words that it chose insofar as they misled or confused consumers, the court concluded.

The April 1 opinion in Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc. will be reported in CCH Advertising Law Guide.

Thursday, April 01, 2010





Consumer Debtors Could Pursue Civil RICO Suit Based on Arbitration Fraud

This posting was written by Mark Engstrom, Editor of CCH RICO Business Disputes Guide.

Consumer debtors pursuing a civil RICO action sufficiently alleged a pattern of racketeering involving arbitration fraud by a private equity firm and one of its subsidiaries, the federal district court in St. Paul, Minnesota has ruled.

Both companies allegedly maintained a financial interest in: (1) a dispute resolution service that had become an affiliate of the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) and (2) an organization that prosecuted arbitrations in front of the NAF. This affiliation created a “clear conflict of interest.”

To support allegations that the NAF’s arbitration hearings were biased, the debtors proffered statistics showing that consumers had won less than 0.2 percent of the 18,000 disputes that the NAF had arbitrated in California between 2001 and 2007.

The debtors also referred to a lawsuit against the NAF in which a former NAF employee had claimed that the NAF routinely engaged in fraudulent and corrupt practices, including “telling arbitrators to rule in favor of creditors and asking creditors how the arbitrators should rule.”

Finally, the debtors noted that a House Committee had discovered, in Congressional hearings about consumer arbitrations, that more than 70 percent of the NAF arbitrations it reviewed should have been dismissed rather than resolved in favor of the lender.

The debtors sufficiently pled a pattern of racketeering, through mail and wire fraud, even though they identified only two specific mailings and no use of the interstate wires. “Thousands” more mailings—including communications from the NAF to consumers, creditors, and its own arbitrators—would “undoubtedly” be revealed through discovery, the court explained.

Further, “it strain[ed] credulity” to believe that the NAF did not use the interstate wires to send any e-mails in support of the wide-ranging fraud that the debtors were alleging.

Because the debtors were not privy to the NAF’s e-mail system, the identification of specific examples of wire fraud would be “almost impossible” without discovery. The debtors’ allegations were therefore sufficient at the pleading stage of the proceedings, and the defendants’ motion to dismiss was denied.

The decision in National Arbitration Forum Trade Practices Litigation appears at CCH RICO Business Disputes Guide ¶11,816.

Wednesday, March 31, 2010





Firms' Gap Insurance Demands Did Not Violate Sherman, Bank Holding Company Act

This posting was written by Darius Sturmer, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

A seller of motor vehicle gap insurance products could not maintain Sherman Act or Bank Holding Company Act claims against a financial services firm and two affiliate entities for the firm's refusal to purchase, from car dealers, credit transactions that included the complaining seller's gap insurance products, the federal district court in Covington, Kentucky, has held.

The complaining insurance seller failed to allege a cognizable antitrust injury stemming from the defendants' conduct and did not establish an unlawful tying arrangement prohibited by the Bank Holding Company Act, the court determined. Dismissal of the claims was granted.

Gap insurance is a type of policy covering the difference, in the event of a "total" loss, between what a car buyer owes on a car and what the primary insurance carrier pays out as its market value at the time of loss. The defendants allegedly would buy credit transactions containing gap insurance products only if those products were on their "approved list," which included products from their own subsidiary but not the complaining company.

Antitrust Injury

The only injury that the plaintiff alleged from the defendants' tying, reciprocal dealing, and exclusive dealing related to its own ability to sell gap insurance products, the court observed. Even if the defendants' alleged actions caused it to lose business, that injury alone was not an antitrust injury because no harm occurred either to the consumer or to competition as a whole.

Although the insurance seller claimed that the conduct decreased competition within the market, it did not allege facts that demonstrated competition was actually diminished. It failed to state how many gap insurance providers existed and how many were on the approved list, thus rendering it impossible to tell the extent to which competition may have been affected.

Moreover, the insurance seller failed to allege an injury that flowed from that which made the defendants' act unlawful. Its alleged injury flowed from its exclusion from the approved list, not from the alleged tying arrangement itself. The Sherman Act did not prohibit use of an approved list by a buyer, or restrict that buyer's freedom to select the entity from which it would purchase products, noted the court.

Tying, Reciprocal Dealing, Exclusive Dealing

Even if the insurance seller had not failed to plead antitrust injury, which was fatal to its Sherman Act claims, its allegations against the defendants had not described a tying arrangement, reciprocal dealing, or exclusive dealing that was prohibited by the Sherman Act, in the court's view.

Bank Holding Company Act

The defending financial services firm and its two affiliate entities did not engage in an unlawful tying arrangement prohibited by the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) through their credit transaction purchasing practices, the court stated. The complaining gap insurance seller was unable to establish the first element for a BHCA claim—the firm's imposition of an anticompetitive tying arrangement by conditioning an extension of credit upon borrower's obtaining additional credit or services from the bank—because the defendants did not extend any credit or provide a service. Rather, they purchased credit transactions that had already been completed between the car dealer and the car buyer.

No tying arrangement existed because the defendants did not require dealers to include gap insurance products in the credit transactions the defendants purchased, or even to buy gap insurance products at all.

The decision is Midwest Agency Services, Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2010-1 Trade Cases ¶76,940.

Tuesday, March 30, 2010





Hospitals’ Steering of Patients to Equipment Providers Did Not Violate Antitrust Law

This posting was written by Darius Sturmer, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

An Alabama hospital and a corporation that operated several hospitals in the same area, along with their affiliated joint ventures that provided durable medical equipment (DME), did not violate the Sherman Act or Alabama antitrust law by allegedly using their control of hospital services to coerce patients into buying or renting DME (including beds, wheelchairs, and oxygen tanks) from those affiliates.

A motion to dismiss the claims of competing DME providers, who were allegedly excluded as a result of the hospital defendants' steering of patients to their affiliates, was granted.

Standing

As an initial matter, the court decided that the competing DME providers had standing to assert the claims. The plaintiffs' allegations in the case—that the hospitals were channeling patient choice to their captive DME providers—were sufficient to show the necessary injury to competition.

The failure of the plaintiffs to allege an actual increase in prices or an actual deterioration in the quality of DME did not defeat the claim of an antitrust injury. If the allegations were proven true, competition would have been injured because the competing DME vendors no longer had access to the patients who needed DME.

The plaintiffs' damages in the case were not premised on their ability to profit while patients “paid an artificially inflated price.” Though the complaining DME providers' injuries were indirect and speculative, their potential damages were duplicative, and the patients were more direct victims, the DME providers were efficient enforcers of the antitrust law. They were much better positioned than consumers to detect an antitrust violation earlier and did not suffer from the same collective-action problems that individual consumers with relatively small injuries did.

Reciprocal Dealing

The complaining DME competitors failed to offer sufficient factual allegations in support of a coercive reciprocity claim, the court found. While reciprocal dealing arrangements could constitute an illegal restraint of trade when coercive, reciprocal dealing was not by itself illegal.

The plaintiffs made no allegation that the hospital staff's continued employment, pay, benefits, or access to the hospital were in any way conditioned on the staff referring patients to their hospital's DME providers. Nothing in the complaint suggested that the hospitals and their staff otherwise had a buyer-seller or other comparable commercial relationship, the court noted.

Refusal to Deal

The defendants did not engage in an unlawful refusal to deal by failing to provide the competing DME providers access to discharged patients, the court added. While the complaining DME competitors sufficiently alleged agreement between the hospitals and their captive DME providers to state a claim that they were acting in concert, the concerted actions in which they engaged did not state an antitrust claim for which relief could be granted.

The hospitals' unilateral termination of their prior voluntary course of dealing, which had been demonstrated by a DME rotational assignment system, did not suggest a willingness to forsake short-term profits. The hospitals terminated the course of dealing after entering into joint ventures with their respective DME providers, and there was nothing in the plaintiffs' complaint, outside of conclusory allegations, plausibly suggesting that the decision to cease the rotational system and exclude competing DME providers from access to the hospitals was for any purpose other than increasing both the short-term and long-term profits of their DME providers, the court said.

Monopolistic Conduct

The defendants did not engage in monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy to monopolize the market for the distribution of DME through their Montgomery and Prattville hospitals, the court also ruled. The complaining DME providers failed to allege either that a single entity (a single hospital) or multiple entities acting in concert (the two hospital distributors of DME) engaged in monopolizing activity.

The only allegation of parallel conduct arose from the fact that the hospitals entered into joint ventures with their respective DME providers during the same broadly-defined time period.

In the absence of any allegations of concerned activity between the hospitals' two DME providers, the only theory that could possibly support the claims was one based on shared monopoly, which was not recognized as a viable cause of action, the court explained.

The decision—Precision CPAP, Inc. v. Jackson Hospital—appears at 2010-1 Trade Cases ¶76,939.

Monday, March 29, 2010





Government Contractor May Have RICO Liability for Human Trafficking

This posting was written by Mark Engstrom, Editor of CCH RICO Business Disputes Guide.

RICO claims predicated on forced labor and human trafficking could proceed against defense contractor Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR), the federal district court in Houston has ruled. The claims were filed by a Nepali man who allegedly was forced to work in Iraq and the family members of twelve Nepali men who were executed in Iraq by a group of terrorists.

Forced Transport, Labor

According to the plaintiffs, a Nepal-based company had recruited workers from Nepal and Sri Lanka to work in a luxury hotel in Amman, Jordan, and in other areas where their lives would not be in danger. When the workers arrived in Jordan, however, their passports were confiscated and another defendant—a Jordanian subcontractor—transported them to Iraq, against their will, to work under the supervision of KBR.

The subcontractor used an unprotected automobile caravan to transport the workers to an air base near Ramadi. The caravan was traveling on the “highly dangerous” Amman-to-Baghdad highway when terrorists stopped the lead cars and took twelve of the workers hostage. The terrorists videotaped hostage statements, sent a copy of the videotape to the Foreign Ministry of Nepal, and then executed the hostages.

The plaintiff, who survived the trip, worked at the air base as a warehouse laborer under the supervision of KBR. After hearing about the deaths of the twelve, the survivor “expressed his desire to return to Nepal,” but KBR told him that he could not leave until he had fulfilled his employment contract. The gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaint was that the defendants had formed a RICO enterprise to procure cheap foreign labor, and thus increase profits, through human trafficking and forced labor.

Jurisdiction

The court found that subject matter jurisdiction existed because the Military Extraterritoriality Jurisdiction Act had extended extraterritorial indictability to parties employed by the U.S. armed forces (including KBR). Nevertheless, the court applied the “conduct test” and the “effects test” to avoid resting jurisdiction on a “relatively murky” area of the law. Although the conduct test was not met, the effects test was.

The effects test asked whether conduct outside of the United States had a substantial adverse effect on U.S. investors or securities markets, the court noted. The plaintiffs alleged that KBR’s acquisition of “cheap labor” through human trafficking had benefited the defendants, disadvantaged their competitors, and adversely affected the U.S. labor market. They also alleged that U.S. taxpayers had funded KBR’s contracts and the racketeering enterprise had passed money through the U.S. banking system.

Because these allegations sufficiently identified “substantial” domestic effects, the court’s adjudication of the plaintiffs’ RICO claims was proper.

Standing

The plaintiffs' alleged injuries—lost wages, out-of-pocket fees, and the loss of alternative employment—were sufficient to establish RICO standing, in the court's view. Although the Fifth Circuit had not addressed the question of whether the family member of a deceased individual had standing to assert RICO claims, the Fourth Circuit’s determination that RICO claims survived the death of an injured party was persuasive.

Enterprise

The absence of a decision-making structure did not prevent the formation of an association-in-fact enterprise composed of KBR and the Jordanian subcontractor, the court determined. The plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the defendants had worked cooperatively to accomplish an illegal purpose: the acquisition of cheap labor through trafficking and forced labor.

Pattern of Racketeering

Assertions that KBR “regularly” employed workers that were transported into Iraq against their will were sufficient to allege a threat of continued criminal activity. According to the plaintiffs, 92 laborers were brought into Iraq—against their will in 2003 and 2004—to work under the supervision of KBR.

These facts were sufficient to allege that the acquisition of cheap workers, against their will, was part of KBR’s modus operandi. The continuity element of a pattern of racketeering was therefore met, the court concluded.

Predicate Acts

The predicate acts of forced labor and human trafficking were sufficiently pled, according to the court. The fact that the complaint did not explicitly allege physical force was inconsequential because “conduct other than the use, or threatened use, of law or physical force may, under some circumstances, have the same effect as the more traditional forma of coercion—or may even be more coercive”

In this case, the plaintiffs’ complaint made the acts of forced labor and human trafficking plausible, which was all that was necessary to allege RICO predicate acts.

The decision is Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, CCH RICO Business Disputes Guide ¶11,824

Friday, March 26, 2010





Gift Card Fees, Expiration Dates Limited by Federal Reserve Rules

This posting was written by William Zale, Editor of CCH Advertising Law Guide.

The Federal Reserve Board has announced final rules that restrict the application of fees and expiration dates to store gift cards, gift certificates, and general-use prepaid cards. The rules become effective August 22, 2010. The rules become effective August 22, 2010.

The Board developed the rules as required by Title IV of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CCH Advertising Law Guide ¶11,900)

Covered products include retail gift cards, which can be used to buy goods or services at a single merchant or affiliated group of merchants, and network-branded gift cards, which are redeemable at any merchant that accepts the card brand.

Exclusions, Marketing Compliance

The rules do not apply to reloadable prepaid cards that are not marketed or labeled as a gift card or gift certificate and prepaid cards received through a loyalty, award, or promotional program, according to the Board. The exclusion will not apply if a reloadable prepaid card is advertised or offered by suggesting the potential use of the card as a gift, according to the Official Staff Interpretations accompanying the rules.

For example, if a card issuer selling a variety of cards sets up at a retailer a promotional display topped by a sign prominently stating “Gift Cards,” the exclusion might not apply to general-purpose reloadable cards.

Similarly, if a banner ad for “Gift Cards” is prominently displayed on the home page of a website, general-purpose reloadable cards sold on the site might not be excluded from the rules’ restrictions on fees and expiration.

Fees

The rules prohibit imposition of dormancy, inactivity, or service fees unless: (1) there has been at least one year of inactivity on the certificate or card; (2) no more than one such fee is charged per month; and (3) the consumer is given clear and conspicuous disclosures about the fees.

Fees subject to the restrictions include monthly maintenance or service fees, balance inquiry fees, and transaction-based fees, such as reload fees, ATM fees, and point-of-sale fees.

Expiration

The rules prohibit the sale or issuance of a gift certificate, store gift card, or general-use prepaid card that has an expiration date of less than five years after the date a certificate or card is issued or the date funds are last loaded.

The expiration date restrictions apply to a consumer’s funds, and not to the certificate or card itself. The rule includes provisions intended to give consumers a reasonable opportunity to purchase a certificate or card with at least five years before the certificate or card expiration date. The rules prohibit any fees for replacing an expired certificate or card, or for refunding the remaining balance, if the underlying funds remain valid.

State Laws, Limited Preemption

The rules prescribe standards for determining whether state laws that govern dormancy, inactivity, or service fees, or expiration dates, are preempted. A state law is not preempted due to inconsistency with federal law if the state law is more protective of consumers.

A state law that is inconsistent may be preempted even if the Board has not issued a determination. However, a financial institution might not be immune from violations of state law if the institution chooses not to comply with the state law and the Board later determines that the state law is not preempted.

Access to State Laws, Smart Chart

Subscribers to the CCH Advertising Law Guide on the Internet have access to more detailed coverage gift certificate and gift card laws in more than 35 states.

A Smart Chart™ gives users quick access to the types of certificates and cards that are subject to—and exempt from—the laws. Coverage of fee restrictions, expiration date restrictions, and disclosure requirements is provided, along with links to the law texts.

Thursday, March 25, 2010





FTC Seeks Comments on Revising COPPA Rule

This posting was written by Cheryl Beise, Editor of CCH Guide to Computer Law.

The FTC announced on March 24 that it is seeking public comments on the costs and benefits of the agency’s Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) Rule.

The COPPA Rule has not changed since its adoption ten years ago. Changes to the online environment over the past five years, including children’s increasing use of mobile technology to access the Internet, warrant reexamining the Rule, the agency said.

COPPA imposes requirements on operators of websites or online services that are aimed at children under 13 years of age, or that knowingly collect personal information from children under 13.

The COPPA Rule requires that online operators notify parents and get their permission before collecting, using, or disclosing children’s personal information. It also imposes security requirements and restrictions on use of information collected about children.

Issues the FTC would like to see addressed are:

• What implications for COPPA enforcement are raised by mobile communications, interactive television, interactive gaming, or other similar interactive media?

• How are automated systems—those that filter out any personally identifiable information prior to posting—being used to review children’s Internet submissions?

• Do operators have the ability to contact specific individuals using information collected from children online, such as persistent IP addresses, mobile geolocation data, or information collected in connection with behavioral advertising? Should the Rule’s definition of “personal information" be expanded accordingly?

• Are there additional technological methods for obtaining verifiable parental consent that should be added to the COPPA Rule? Should any of the current methods be removed?

• Are parents exercising their right under the Rule to review or delete personal information collected from their children? What challenges do operators face in authenticating parents?

• Does the Rule’s process for the FTC’s approval of self-regulatory guidelines (safe harbor programs) enhance compliance? Should the criteria for FTC approval and oversight of the guidelines be modified?

The 90-day comment period will end on June 30, 2010.

The Request for Public Comment on the Federal Trade Commission’s Implementation of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule is posted here on the FTC’s website. The FTC’s March 24 Press Release is available here.

Wednesday, March 24, 2010





UFOC Disclaimers Did Not Preclude Franchisee Reliance on Nondisclosure

This posting was written by Pete Reap, Editor of CCH Business Franchise Guide.

The general language of the exculpatory clauses in a coffee shop franchisor’s Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) did not preclude several prospective franchisees from reasonably relying on the franchisor’s nondisclosure of the financial losses of its parent company, a Colorado appellate court has decided.

A Colorado trial court’s judgment—dismissing the franchisees’ claim of fraudulent nondisclosure of the historic losses of the franchisor’s parent—was vacated.

Financial Losses of Parent Company

The losses were unlike the financial performance of the franchisor’s company stores, which the franchisor’s UFOC explained was not predictive of franchise results at a different location and under a different management, according to the appellate court. Rather, ongoing parent company losses could foreshadow its insolvency, which could destroy the value of the franchise, regardless of its location or management.

No clause in the UFOC either referred to information about the parent company’s financial condition or negated reasonable inferences that could be drawn from assumptions about this information.

The trial court made no finding that the franchisees had been discouraged from relying on inferences concerning parent company financial information. The only finding was that franchisees had been told that financial information about the parent would not be provided.

Neither of the disclaimers cited by the trial court disclaimed reliance on undisclosed information. Thus, the trial court’s paraphrasing of the disclaimers as “[franchisees] acknowledged that they were not relying on any other information at the time they entered into their Franchise Agreements” was overbroad, the appellate court held.

FTC Franchise Rule

The Federal Trade Commission franchise rule did not preempt Colorado common law, which allegedly required the franchisor to disclose that the parent company had been, or was, unprofitable. The appellate court rejected the franchisor’s contention that, because the parent company was not a guarantor, the franchise rule prohibited the disclosure of financial information about the parent.

The plain language of Section 436.1(a)(20) of the 1979 franchise rule would not preclude a general comment, such as “The franchisor is the wholly owned subsidiary of _________, which has not shown a profit during its _____ years of operation,” according to the court. The section did not preempt common law alleged to require disclosure of the parent financial information.

The franchise rule sought to protect franchisees from unfair or deceptive practices and, as mentioned in the FTC commentary for the 2007 rule, disclosures did not “create a safe harbor for franchisors engaging in otherwise unlawful conduct.”

Preemption of State Law

The FTC addresses preemption in Section 436.10(b), explaining:

“The FTC does not intend to preempt the franchise practices laws of any state or local government, except to the extent of any inconsistency with part 436. A law is not inconsistent with part 436 if it affords prospective franchisees equal or greater protection, such as registration of disclosure documents or more extensive disclosures.”

Because of the reference to “franchise practices laws,” there could be no preemption of common law claims, the court held. In any event, the reference to “inconsistency” limited the court’s inquiry to direct conflict, not express or field preemption.

There was no inconsistency between the prohibition against disclosing a parent’s financial statements absent a guarantee and merely informing prospective franchisees that the franchisor’s parent has been, or is, unprofitable.

The decision—Colorado Coffee Bean LLC v. Peaberry Coffee Inc.—will appear at CCH Business Franchise Guide ¶14,325.

Tuesday, March 23, 2010





Drug Store Chain, Supplement Maker Executives Settle FTC Deceptive Ad Claims

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

Walgreen Company has agreed to pay nearly $6 million to settle FTC charges that the company deceptively advertised its “Wal-Born” line of dietary supplements, the agency announced today.

Cold Prevention Claims

In its complaint filed in the federal district court in Chicago, the FTC contended that the drug store chain improperly claimed that its supplements could prevent colds, fight germs, and boost the immune system.

Under the proposed settlement, Walgreens would be barred from claiming that its products prevent or treat cold or flu symptoms, or protect against cold and flu viruses by boosting the immune system, unless there is scientific evidence to back up the claims. The $5.97 million settlement with Walgreens includes $1.2 million that will be used to pay consumers as the result of a separate class action suit.

In addition to the proposed Walgreens settlement, the FTC announced that a federal district court in Cleveland had approved a settlement in a separate case with two principal officers of Improvita Health Products Inc., the manufacturer of Walgreens’ “Wal-Born” and other supplements.

Under that settlement, the individuals will be required to pay $565,000 and will be barred from making unsupported claims for their cold and flu treatments. In addition, they must (1) take steps to ensure that their employees comply with the settlement and (2) comply with standard FTC record-keeping and reporting requirements.

The FTC suit against the corporate defendant, Improvita Health Products, Inc., remains in litigation.

Prior Actions

The FTC’s agreements with Walgreens and the Improvita officers come after the agency settled similar cases last year involving two other pharmacy chains, CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (CCH Trade Regulation Reporter ¶16,359) and Rite Aid Corporation (CCH Trade Regulation Reporter ¶16,331).

The action is FTC v. Walgreen Co., FTC File No. 092 3134, and FTC v. Improvita Health Products Inc., FTC File No. 072 3189. A press release, the complaints, and the consent decrees appear here on the FTC website.

Further details will appear in CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

Monday, March 22, 2010





Google's Sponsored Links Not False Ads or Designations of Origin

This posting was written by William Zale, Editor of CCH Advertising Law Guide.

Google's publishing of “sponsored links” in response to an online search for a building materials seller's “Styrotrim” trademark could not constitute false advertising or false designations of origin, affiliation, connection, or association of a competitor with the seller in violation of the Lanham Act, the federal district court in Sacramento has ruled.

Ad Words Program

The seller challenged the use of “Styrotrim” as a suggested keyword in Google's AdWords program, through which advertisers bid for placement of sponsored links in keyword search results.

The seller contended that Google's placement of competitors above the seller’s business on results pages confused consumers into believing that competitors' products were preferable to the seller’s and, in essence, was a form of “bait and switch” advertising.

Lack of Direct Competition

Although Google might provide advertising support for others in the seller’s industry, Google did not directly sell, produce, or otherwise compete in the building materials market. Without a showing of direct competition, the seller failed to state a claim for false advertising under the Lanham Act, according to the court.

Even if a “sponsored link” might confuse a consumer, with several different sponsored links appearing on a page it was hardly likely that a consumer might believe each one was the true producer or origin of the Styrotrim product. As such, the seller failed to properly plead a false designation of origin.

Communications Decency Act Immunity

Under the Communications Decency Act, Google was an interactive computer service immune from common law claims including fraud. The seller argued that Google was exposed to liability as an “information content provider” because, through its keyword suggestion tool, Google in fact did participate in the content of advertisements.

Keyword suggestion, however, was a “neutral tool” that did nothing more than provide options that advertisers could adopt or reject, in the court's view.

The opinion in Jurin v. Google Inc. appears at CCH Advertising Law Guide ¶63,777.

Friday, March 19, 2010





Subway Can Pursue Suit Challenging Quiznos' Comparative Ads

This posting was written by William Zale, Editor of CCH Advertising Law Guide.

Lanham Act claims challenging Quiznos' television commercials and an Internet contest, comparing the amount of meat in Quiznos and Subway sandwiches, could not be rejected on summary judgment because there were numerous unresolved issues of material fact, the federal district court in Hartford has ruled.

Twice the Meat

Quiznos contended that the claims made in its Cheesesteak Commercial were true because its Prime Rib sandwich actually contained two times as much meat as the Subway Cheesesteak sandwich. However, field testing of 651 franchises conducted by Quiznos showed that 27.65% of franchises failed to meet Quiznos’ standard of 5 oz. of meat, and 10.29% made sandwiches with less than 4 oz. of meat, the court found.

A comprehensive survey of 4,370 Quiznos franchises revealed that 44.14% of the Prime Rib sandwiches tested contained less than 5 oz. of meat, and 5.86% contained less than 4 oz. of meat.

The parties appeared to agree that the Subway Cheesesteak sandwich contained at least 2.5 ounces of meat. In addition, the Subway Cheesesteak was available with a double portion of meat for an extra $1.00.

Literal Falsity

Quiznos unsuccessfully argued that the commercial could not be literally false because it was ambiguous. The court determined that the commercial clearly conveyed the “twice the meat” message by direct side-by-side comparison of the two sandwiches along with commentary by “men on the street” indicating that the Subway sandwich has “little meat” or “no meat,” as well as by the text frame reading that the Quiznos sandwich had “more than 2x the meat.”

Implied Falsity—Price Message

Genuine issues of fact were created by the parties' conflicting surveys of whether Quiznos Ultimate Italian commercial conveyed a price message. Given Quiznos' claim that its sandwich contained a double portion of meat, if the competing products were perceived as costing the same, consumers arguably were misled into believing that the Quiznos sandwich would be a better value for the money.

Internet Video Contest

Finally, there were genuine issues of fact as to whether false representations were made in connection with Quiznos' Internet-based contest, which solicited videos through the domain name “meatnomeat.com.”

Four posted sample videos depicted a Subway sandwich as having no meat or less meat than a Quiznos sandwich. Quiznos' contention that the posting of the videos did not constitute commercial speech for the purpose of influencing customer to buy Quiznos' products was unpersuasive, according to the court.

The opinion, Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. QIP Holder LLC, is reported at CCH Advertising Law Guide ¶63,763.

Thursday, March 18, 2010





Mortgage Relief Scheme Violated New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act

This posting was written by Jody Coultas, Editor of CCH State Unfair Trade Practices Law.

A real estate lawyer and his client engaged in a fraudulent mortgage relief scheme that violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) by misleading mortgage holders, according to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Trenton, New Jersey.

The mortgage holders filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in an attempt to save their home from foreclosure. They then entered into an agreement with the real estate lawyer’s client, Frederick Cleveland, to sell the house for $555,000. Cleveland was to pay off $510,000 on the two existing mortgages on the house and another $46,000 to the mortgage holders to pay for the Chapter 13 plan.

Instead, Cleveland borrowed $646,400 and took $100,000 for himself. The mortgage holders were unaware that the monthly payments they made to Cleveland were not being used to service the financing and did not understand that if Cleveland failed to pay the new lender, they could lose their home.

Misrepresentations

In preparing the closing documents, the real estate lawyer misrepresented the sale price and falsely told the mortgage holders that Cleveland was investing his own cash.

Although the mortgage holders were not going to receive any money, the real estate lawyer told them they would receive payments from a trust account. Cleveland eventually defaulted on the new loan and the lender initiated foreclosure proceedings.

The real estate lawyer and Cleveland violated the CFA by making false and misleading statements regarding a mortgage relief plan, according to the court. The CFA prohibits the use of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, or fraud.

Sophisticated Consumer Exception

Although Cleveland argued that the mortgage holders could not avail themselves of the CFA because they were sophisticated parties and could not be misled, the court found that there was no statutory exception for sophisticated consumers.

Even if a business practice was not fraudulent or deceptive, that practice could nevertheless violate the CFA if it was unconscionable. Here, Cleveland found the mortgage holders in a very vulnerable position and took advantage of them for personal gain.

Damages, Attorney’s Fees

An award of actual damages, attorneys’ fees, and other appropriate equitable relief was available to the mortgage holders. The mortgage holders suffered an ascertainable loss because the new mortgage was $646,400, even though they had owed only $529,608. Thus, the damage award was over $350,000, treble the difference between the loss and what the mortgage holders actually received.

The court noted that the mortgage holders could submit proof of their attorneys’ fees and costs, as well as seek other equitable remedies. The real estate lawyer was held jointly liable for the damages, costs, and fees because he conspired with his client to violate the CFA.

The mortgage holders' lawyer stated that this was the first reported case in New Jersey concerning mortgage foreclosure rescue schemes.

The decision is In re O'Brien, CCH State Unfair Trade Practices Law ¶32,012.

Wednesday, March 17, 2010





Late Opt-Outs Permitted in Antitrust Class Action Against Insurers, Brokers

This posting was written by Darius Sturmer, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

In an antitrust class action against insurance companies and brokers, a federal district court did not abuse its discretion when it extended the “opt-out” deadline and modified the settlement class so that late-filing opt-outs could elect to be excluded from the class settlement, the U.S. Court of Appeals in Philadelphia has ruled in a not-for-publication opinion.

Accordingly, settling defendants were not entitled to a permanent injunction blocking the late-filing opt-outs from pursuing state court antitrust litigation.
Several class action suits were filed in 2004 against insurance brokers and insurers for their participation in an alleged bid rigging conspiracy.

In February 2009, a final judgment and order, approving a class-wide settlement, was filed. Pursuant to the order, all members of the class released any and all claims against the settling defendants that could have been raised in the class action suit.

The settling defendants filed motions to enjoin two companies from pursuing state court actions because the companies failed to opt out in a timely fashion.

In response, the companies filed motions in the district court to extend the “opt-out” deadline and to modify the settlement class so that each could elect to be excluded from the class settlement.

The district court exercised reasonable discretion in granting the motion to extend the deadline after concluding that the late-filers' failure to meet the “opt-out” deadline was “excusable neglect,” the appellate court ruled.

In light of the deadline extension, and the subsequent removal of the late-filing opt-outs from the settlement class, the district court correctly denied the defendants' motion for a permanent injunction barring the late-filing opt-outs' state court litigation.

The March 9 decision, In re: Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, appears at 2010-1 Trade Cases ¶76,923.

Tuesday, March 16, 2010





Tax Software Firms, Organization Partnering with IRS Were Immune from Antitrust Suits

This posting was written by Darius Sturmer, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

A group of private sector tax software companies and an organization that allied those companies in a free tax preparation and e-filing service partnership with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) were protected under the implied immunity doctrine from claims asserted by a putative class of taxpayers and tax preparers that the companies and organization violated federal antitrust law by agreeing among themselves to limit their offering of free electronic-filing ("e-filing") services to the taxpayers, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals in Philadelphia. Dismissal of the claims was affirmed.

The claims originally had been dismissed at the federal district court level in 2008 (2008-1 Trade Cases ¶76,193). However, the plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their complaint on the basis that it might be possible for them to allege facts triggering an exception to conduct-based implied antitrust immunity that had been created by the Supreme Court in 1973. The plaintiffs did replead, attempting to invoke this exception, but their claims were again dismissed last year.

Conduct-Based Immunity

The defending companies and organization were entitled to conduct-based immunity because their allegedly anticompetitive conduct was compelled by the terms of the partnership agreement and appeared to be consistent with the IRS's policy regarding electronic tax preparation and filing, the appellate court decided.

Rejected was an argument that the conduct-based implied antitrust immunity was accorded to private parties like the defendants only when they were acting at the direction of a government agency and providing a government service. The specific nature of a private entity's conduct did not need to be the provision of a governmental function, provided the conduct was directed by a federal agency, pursuant to a defined government program or policy. Whether the particular activity in question was of a private or governmental nature was immaterial, the court noted.

Free to File” Partnership Agreement

It was clear that the IRS was statutorily authorized to enter into the "Free File" program partnership agreement with the defending companies and organization, and that the agreement and its accompanying Memorandum of Understanding explicitly required the defendants to restrict the availability of free electronic tax preparation and filing services under the program, the court explained.

The IRS's decision to limit the availability of free services under the Free File program was part of its ongoing attempt to achieve the statutory goal of increased e-filing through cooperation with the private sector.

Exception to Implied Immunity Doctrine

The implied immunity doctrine exception articulated by the Supreme Court in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States (1973-1 Trade Cases ¶74,373) was inapplicable, the court added. That exception pertained only to cases in which (1) a private entity had insisted on anticompetitive restrictions in its contract with a government agency and (2) those restrictions hindered the government.


Allegations that the challenged output ceiling provisions in the partnership agreement were inserted at the defendants' insistence and hampered the IRS's ability to fulfill its goal of increasing electronic filing were directly refuted by the agency the following year, in the Management Response portion of a report issued by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration analyzing the partnership agreement.

The decision is Byers v. Intuit Inc., 2010-1 Trade Cases ¶76,928.

Monday, March 15, 2010





Cosmetics Firm Resolves California Resale Price Fixing Suit

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

A company that markets cosmetics and skin care products has agreed to settle a civil suit brought by the State of California, alleging that it engaged in vertical price fixing in per se violation of the California Cartwright Act and the California Unfair Competition Law.

The state alleged that the northern California-based company entered into distribution agreements with resale price maintenance components, including prohibitions on pricing below suggested retail prices.

Under the terms of a final judgment approved by a California trial court, the cosmetics company was prohibited from entering into agreements to fix resale prices.

In addition, the company was required to pay a $70,000 civil penalty under the Unfair Competition Law and $50,000 to cover investigation costs and expenses.

Further details regarding The People of the State of California v. DermaQuest, Inc. will appear at 2010-1 Trade Cases ¶76,922.

State v. Federal Antitrust Law

The case is a reminder that resale pricing practices can run afoul of state antitrust laws, even if such conduct is no longer considered per se illegal under federal antitrust law.

In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 2007-1 Trade Cases ¶75,753, reversed a 96-year-old precedent applying the per se rule to vertical price fixing.

And California is not the only state to challenge vertical price fixing. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin, furniture maker Herman Miller, Inc. entered into a consent decree resolving a multi-state complaint, alleging resale price fixing in violation of federal and state antitrust law.

Herman Miller was prohibited from agreeing with dealers to fix the resale price at which its furniture was advertised or sold to end-user consumers and from terminating a dealer or discriminating against a dealer to secure a commitment from the dealer to adhere to the manufacturer's suggested resale prices. The manufacturer was also required to pay a monetary payment of $750,000 under the consent decree.

The consent decree settled charges brought by the States of Illinois, Michigan, and New York that the manufacturer violated federal and state antitrust laws by entering into agreements with dealers to fix the prices at which its furniture was offered to consumers.

The case is State of New York, et al. v. Herman Miller, Inc., No. 08-civ-02977 , 2008-2 Trade Cases ¶76,454.

Friday, March 12, 2010





FTC Commissioner Jones Harbour Resigns

This posting was written by John W. Arden. Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

Following the Senate confirmation of her successor last week, Federal Trade Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour submitted her resignation as Commissioner, effective April 6, 2010.

Commissioner Jones Harbour will be succeeded by Julie Brill, who was confirmed by the Senate on March 3, along with fellow FTC nominee Edith Ramirez.

Brill will serve a seven-year term, starting from September 26, 2009, the date that Jones Harbour’s term expired.

“During my six and one-half years on the Commission, I have had the privilege of serving with eight tremendously talented Commissioners,” said Jones Harbour. “I thank all of them for their fellowship and friendship, and for always keeping me "on my game."

She also thanked FTC senior managers and career staff for their substantive expertise and their devotion to the agency’s competition and consumer protection missions.

“These individuals are the real driving force behind the Commission's tradition of excellence, and I will always be proud of all we have accomplished together,” said the Commissioner.

The March 10 statement by Jones Harbour appears here on the FTC website.

Thursday, March 11, 2010





LifeLock Agrees to Settle FTC, State Suits Challenging Identity Theft Protection Claims

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

Identity theft service LifeLock, Inc. has agreed to pay $12 million and to refrain from making deceptive claims to settle FTC and state charges that it misrepresented its services. The company also is required to take more stringent measures to safeguard the personal information collected from customers.

In addition to LifeLock, the FTC complaint named co-founders Richard Todd Davis and Robert Maynard, Jr., who will be barred from making the same misrepresentations as LifeLock.

Since 2006, LifeLock’s ads have claimed that it could prevent identity theft for consumers willing to sign up for its $10-a-month service, according to the FTC.

“While LifeLock promised consumers complete protection against all types of identity theft, in truth, the protection it actually provided left enough holes that you could drive a truck through it,” said FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz. Lifelock's services are widely advertised by displaying the CEO’s Social Security number on the side of a truck.

The FTC challenged claims that LifeLock would prevent unauthorized changes to customers’ address information, that it constantly monitored activity on customer credit reports, and that it would ensure that a customer always would receive a telephone call from a potential creditor before a new account was opened.

LifeLock allegedly misrepresented its own data security. The FTC contended that LifeLock’s data was not encrypted, and sensitive consumer information was not shared only on a “need to know” basis.

According to the agency, the company’s data system was vulnerable and could have been exploited by those seeking access to customer information.

The FTC and state settlements with LifeLock bar deceptive claims and prohibit the company from misrepresenting the “means, methods, procedures, effects, effectiveness, coverage, or scope of any identity theft protection service.” They also bar misrepresentations about the risk of identity theft and the manner and extent to which LifeLock protects consumers’ personal information.

The settlements further require LifeLock to establish a comprehensive data security program and obtain biennial independent third-party assessments of that program for twenty years.

A press release concerning FTC v. LifeLock, Inc., FTC File No. 072 306, announced March 9, 2010, appears here on the FTC website. Text of the complaint and proposed final judgment appear here.

Further details will appear in the CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

Wednesday, March 10, 2010





Voting Equipment Company Resolves U.S., State Concerns over Acquisition

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

Election Systems & Software, Inc.—the largest provider of voting equipment systems in the United States—has agreed to settle an antitrust complaint filed by the U.S. Department of Justice and nine state attorneys general, challenging its 2009 acquisition of Premier Election Solutions Inc.

A proposed consent decree, awaiting approval in the federal district court in Washington, D.C., is intended to restore competition lost as a result of the consummated acquisition by requiring ES&S to divest voting equipment systems assets to a buyer approved by the Justice Department.

The assets to be divested include the means to produce all versions of Premier’s hardware, software, and firmware used to record, tabulate, transmit, or report votes, including the Assure 1.2 system, and a license to better serve disabled voters.

Combination of Close Competitors

The federal and state antitrust enforcers alleged that the consummated transaction violated the Clayton Act by combining what customers considered to be the two closest competitors in the provision of voting equipment systems. The two companies were certified in more jurisdictions than any other vendor, offered a complete suite of voting equipment system products, and had good reputations.

The investigation of the transaction did not begin until after the companies had combined their assets and dismantled many of Premier’s operating divisions. ES&S was not required to report the proposed acquisition to the Justice Department and FTC because the cash value of the transaction was $5 million, significantly below the mandatory reporting threshold for mergers under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.

Senator Schumer’s Concerns

Soon after the acquisition was announced, however, the Justice Department heard from critics of the transaction. Senator Charles E. Schumer, chairman of the Senate committee that oversees election issues, sent a letter to U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, urging the Justice Department to conduct a full and fair review” of the acquisition. A news release on Senator Schumer's reaction appears here.

The Chairman of the Senate Rules and Administration Committee later announced that the committee’s staff would launch a formal review of potential problems posed by the merger. A report expressing the committee’s concerns with the acquisition was submitted to the Justice Department in January.

American Antitrust Institute Views

Also in January, the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) sent a letter to Christine Varney, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, stating that the “likely competitive harm from the acquisition will be felt in the loss of any real competition in the competitive bidding process by which political subdivisions acquire voting technology and services.”

AAI “urge[d] the Division to strictly scrutinize this transaction and ensure a final remedy that preserves and promotes competition among multiple, qualified private vendors of voting technology and services to all political subdivisions in the years to come.”

Text of the letter appears here.

The state attorneys general that joined the suit were Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Washington.

A Department of Justice press release appears here. Text of the complaint and the proposed consent decree in U.S. v. Election Systems & Software, Inc., Case 1:10-cv-00380, appear on the Department of Justice Antitrust Division website. Further details will be reported in CCH Trade Regulation Reports.

Tuesday, March 09, 2010





Michigan Blue Cross Drops Acquisition Plan After U.S. Threatens Suit

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

Blue Care Networks of Michigan and Sparrow Health System announced on March 8 that they were ending their agreement that would have enabled Blue Care Network to acquire the membership of Lansing, Michigan-based Physicians Health Plan of Mid-Michigan.

Blue Care Network is a nonprofit HMO owned by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan. Physicians Health Plan of Mid-Michigan is a not-for-profit HMO owned by Sparrow, the largest hospital system in Lansing.

According to a joint statement, both organizations concluded that the transaction would not receive regulatory clearance without litigation.

The Department of Justice issued a statement on March 8, praising the decision. The Department had threatened to challenge the transaction on the ground that it would have given Blue Cross-Michigan control over nearly 90 percent of the commercial health insurance market in the Lansing area. Text of the Justice Department statement appears here on the Department of Justice Antitrust Division website.

“We welcome the decision by Blue Cross-Michigan and Physicians health Plan of Mid-Michigan to abandon their deal, which will preserve competition among health insurance companies in Lansing,” said Christine Varney, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division. “The merger would have likely led to higher prices, lower levels of service, and decreased quality of health care for consumers.”

The Michigan Attorney General’s office worked with the Justice Department in investigating the competitive effects of the proposed merger.

In a March 8 statement, Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox called the collapse of the transition “great news for Michigan residents.” He went on to say that “[c]ompetition is the force that keeps prices down and quality up.”

Cox also questioned how the company could afford to buy other companies when it recently claimed to be struggling financially. He noted that Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and its subsidiaries have spent over $350 million buying other companies since 2005, while claiming millions in losses and asking for massive rate increases.

The statement appears here on the Michigan Attorney General’s website.

Monday, March 08, 2010





Sub-Distributor Failed to Adequately Allege Illinois “Franchise”

This posting was written by Pete Reap, Editor of CCH Business Franchise Guide.

A sub-distributor of electrical components failed to adequately allege that its relationship with a distributor was a "franchise" under the meaning of the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act, according to the federal district court in Chicago.

Accordingly, the sub-distributor’s counterclaim against the distributor for violations of the Act’s registration, anti-fraud, and "good cause" for termination provisions was dismissed.

After the distributor terminated the parties’ agreements and brought suit for failure to pay for delivered goods, the sub-distributor responded with several counterclaims, including the alleged violations of the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act.

Association with Distributor’s Trademark

The sub-distributor argued that it pled sufficient facts to permit the court to infer the existence of a franchise relationship under federal notice pleading standards. However, the sub-distributor’s counterclaim was devoid of any allegation that it used the distributor’s name or mark in marketing the distributor’s electrical components, as required by the statutory definition of "franchise," the court ruled.

Although it could be inferred that the sub-distributor used the distributor’s tradename or mark because the components at issue were alleged to be unique, it was certainly not a necessary inference, the court commented. Moreover, there was no allegation that the operation of the sub-distributor’s business was substantially associated with the distributor’s mark.

Franchise Fee Requirement

The sub-distributor cited caselaw and argued that it was not required to make allegations specific to the Franchsie Disclosure Act's requirements for a "franchise." However, the sub-distributor failed to allege that it operated a business under the distributor’s mark or paid the distributor a "franchise fee," two of the elements necessary to establish a franchise.

Notice pleading required a plaintiff to plead sufficient facts to make a claim plausible on its faith and the sub-distributor’s alleged facts did not reach even that low threshold.

The decision is BJB Electric v. North Continental Enterprises, CCH Business Franchise Guide ¶14,317.

Sunday, March 07, 2010





Company Owner Not Liable for Violations of Iowa Anti-Spam Law

This posting was written by Thomas A. Long, Editor of CCH Privacy Law in Marketing.

An individual who co-owned and operated a corporation that sent a large number of unsolicited commercial e-mails in an effort to generate leads for a mortgage broker could not be held jointly and severally liable to an Internet service provider for $236 million in statutory damages under Iowa's anti-spam statute, the U.S. Court of Appeals in St. Louis has decided.

A ruling of the federal district court in Davenport, Iowa (CCH Privacy Law in Marketing ¶60,257) was reversed and remanded.

The individual could not be held directly liable for her conduct because she did not use an interactive computer service to “initiate” the sending of spam, the court said.
She was not the person who hit the “send” button transmitting the spam. The “spamming operation” was conducted by another owner-operator of the company. The individual's acting as a liaison between her corporation and mortgage-lead purchasers was not sufficient for liability.

The statute required not only that she initiated the sending of spam, but that she did so via an interactive computer service. There was no evidence that the individual ever used an interactive computer service.

The statute did not create liability for conspiracy or aiding and abetting. The individual could not be held liable under common-law theories of conspiracy and aiding and abetting because the ISP did not establish that it had sustained the requisite actual damages, according to the court.

The decision is Kramer v. Perez, CCH Privacy Law in Marketing ¶60,440.